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ABSTRACT 
Suspect classification analysis is dead.  Or so it would seem.   
As is well known, suspect classification analysis and the associated tiers of scrutiny framework are 
the primary doctrinal features of contemporary equal protection jurisprudence. How plaintiffs fare 
under these twin doctrines determines the ultimate fate of their equal protection claims.  
Accordingly, equal protection advocates often turn their attention to suspect classification analysis 
in crafting their arguments. 
And yet, despite the profound impact of suspect classification analysis on contemporary equal 
protection jurisprudence, the doctrine sits much like an aging patriarch, exerting a level of control 
that far exceeds its actual efficacy.  Indeed, suspect classification analysis was conspicuously 
absent in the United States Supreme Court’s most recent term, and it has been well over a quarter 
century since the Court last recognized a new suspect classification.  The doctrine has been 
lambasted by scholars and jurists alike.  Further, as this Article argues below, worse than being 
ineffective, suspect classification analysis actively inhibits the growth of equal protection 
jurisprudence. 
This raises the inevitable question: is there anything of value to be salvaged from suspect 
classification analysis?  This Article contends that there is.  Rather than reading the Court’s 
suspect classification jurisprudence for the discrete doctrinal innovations of any one case, this 
Article takes the long view in an effort to discern from these cases a political theory and associated 
theory of judicial review—that is, the elusive normative philosophy of the Equal Protection Clause. 
In taking this perspective, what emerges is a theory of judicial review in the equal protection 
context that focuses not on protecting minorities from the inevitable flaws of a majoritarian 
political process, but on protecting individuals from the social and political effects of laws that, 
based on objective characteristics, can be identified as tending to create and enforce permanent 
divisions between social classes—that is, a caste society.  
 
 * Visiting Lecturer, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.  J.D., Yale Law School, 
1998.  B.A., Williams College, 1994.  Thanks to Erwin Chemerinsky, Patience Crowder, 
William Eskridge, Christopher Lasch, Kevin Lynch, Catherine Smith, Michael Sousa, Rob-
in Sterling, and Lindsey Webb for comments and feedback on earlier drafts.  Special 
thanks to my outstanding research assistants, Casey Giltner, Sara Hildebrand, and Conrad 
Imel. 
740 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:3 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 740 
A.  The Problem of Contemporary Prejudices ............................ 741 
B.  Suspect Classification Analysis in Context .......................... 743 
I.  MISSTEPS ................................................................................... 747 
A.  Plessy v. Ferguson and the Failure of Rationality .............. 748 
B.  Carolene Products and Its Surprising Progeny ................. 751 
C.  Suspect Classifications:  The Unarticulated Race Paradigm .. 755 
D.  Quasi-Suspect Classifications:  Stereotype and Self-
Determination .............................................................. 761 
E.  Non-Suspect Classifications:  Differences That Matter........... 778 
II.  DISCONTENTS .......................................................................... 788 
A.  The Pragmatists ............................................................. 788 
B.  The Improvers ................................................................ 790 
C.  The Disassemblers........................................................... 793 
III.  TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE BEYOND SUSPECT 
CLASSIFICATIONS .................................................................... 795 
A.  The Fundamental Illegitimacy of Suspect Classification 
Analysis ...................................................................... 796 
B.  An Alternative Reading of Suspect Classification 
Jurisprudence ............................................................... 799 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 802 
INTRODUCTION 
There have been myriad critiques of suspect classification analysis, 
from both the bench and the academy.  The most prominent con-
cerns are that the analysis does not protect groups that it should pro-
tect, and that it is internally inconsistent as well as inconsistently ap-
plied. 
This Article is concerned with two other problems:  the failure of 
suspect classification analysis to recognize contemporary prejudices 
and the unwarranted role of the analysis in justifying the institution 
of judicial review.  But there is no need to throw the baby out with 
the bath water.  Rather, these very concerns can be addressed by 
reading the Supreme Court’s suspect classification jurisprudence not 
for the discrete doctrinal innovations of each case, but for a political 
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theory and an associated, alternative theory of judicial review latent in 
the Court’s reasoning in this area.1 
What emerges from this reading is a political theory that is less 
concerned with the ordering of social groups and more concerned 
with preserving individual self-determination and the social mobility 
that gives self-determination meaning.  This primary concern, in 
turn, provides a more vigorous and principled justification for the 
role of the judiciary in overturning the actions of the political 
branches. 
A.  The Problem of Contemporary Prejudices 
Close-minded they were—as every age is, including our own, with regard to 
matters it cannot guess, because it simply does not consider them debatable.2 
The central challenge of equal protection jurisprudence is not to 
account for those prejudices that are already apparent to us (the 
blunt and obvious biases of our forefathers), but for those prejudices 
that today seem natural, familiar, and fair.3  Stated another way, the 
central challenge of equal protection jurisprudence is to prevent an-
 
 1 In this way, this project is directly inspired by Bruce Ackerman’s 1985 essay reading foot-
note four of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), toward a similar 
end.  Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715 (1985). 
 2 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 566–67 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Here, Jus-
tice Scalia was acknowledging the persistence of prejudice, which always takes new forms 
for new generations.  He made this assertion toward the larger point that our democratic 
system is well equipped to eventually root out these prejudices and the associated oppres-
sion of disfavored social groups.  Id. at 567.  This Article starts from the same initial prem-
ise—that biases are ever-present and evolving, such that we are generally unaware of the 
prejudices of our own time—but contends that it is precisely the role of the judiciary to 
balance majoritarian complacency and prevent unfair prejudices from being enshrined in 
and perpetuated by the public laws. 
 3 See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects:  The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1997) (“It is now commonplace to 
condemn slavery and segregation—a rhetorical practice presumably intended to bind 
Americans ever more closely to principles of equality.  But repeated condemnation of 
slavery and segregation may have just the opposite effect.  We have demonized subordi-
nating practices of the past to such a degree that condemning such practices may instead 
function to exonerate practices contested in the present, none of which looks so unremit-
tingly ‘evil’ by contrast.”); see also Michael Gentithes, The Equal Protection Clause and Immu-
tability:  The Characteristics of Suspect Classifications, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 507, 522–23 (2010) 
(“The Equal Protection Clause should protect against discrimination based upon immu-
table characteristics regardless of whether any case involving such discrimination has pre-
viously been litigated or whether that particular form of discrimination has become prev-
alent only recently.  In other words, the clause should respond to more than history; it 
must be strong enough to protect against novel forms of discrimination that may arise in 
the future.”). 
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other Plessy v. Ferguson4 or another Bowers v. Hardwick5—decisions 
soaked in the prejudices of their time and entirely devoid of any cog-
nitive or doctrinal mechanism to correct the unreflective, prejudicial 
impulse.  In the passage quoted above, Justice Antonin Scalia accepts 
capitulation to contemporary prejudices as inevitable, although 
something that can be corrected over time.  This Article contends 
that we can aspire to more. 
The Court has, in fact, devised mechanisms that are supposed to 
be particularly adept at rooting out unfair prejudices:  suspect classi-
fication analysis and the associated tiers-of-scrutiny framework.  Sus-
pect classification analysis identifies those groups that are likely to be 
the targets of unfair prejudice; heightened scrutiny requires the judi-
ciary to take a more skeptical view of laws that explicitly target those 
groups. 
To identify which groups merit additional judicial solicitude, sus-
pect classification analysis traditionally asks if a particular social 
group (1) constitutes a discrete and insular minority; (2) has suffered 
a history of discrimination; (3) is politically powerless; (4) is defined 
by an immutable trait; and (5) is defined by a trait that is generally 
irrelevant to one’s ability to function in society.6  If the Court answers 
“yes” to some portion of these questions, then it will deem that group 
a suspect or quasi-suspect class and will apply more searching scrutiny 
to laws discriminating against that group.  These twin doctrines (sus-
pect classification analysis and heightened scrutiny) are supposed to 
identify and protect against laws that enforce invidious discrimina-
tion. 
But, as demonstrated below, these doctrinal mechanisms are use-
ful (and indeed, are invoked) only in cases where the prejudice at is-
sue has already been recognized and understood as unfair.  They do 
nothing to force identification of unrecognized and evolving (that is, 
contemporary) prejudices.  And while heightened scrutiny is intend-
 
 4 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 547–52 (1896).  In Plessy (discussed at length below), the 
United States Supreme Court held that racial segregation on railroad cars was permissible 
under the now-infamous “separate but equal” doctrine.  Id. 
 5 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191–95 (1986) (upholding a state statute criminalizing 
sodomy based on the prevalence of such laws in the nation’s history).  Bowers is not dis-
cussed at length here because it is not a recognized equal protection case.  But Bowers 
may nonetheless be compared to Plessy in that it represents an instance of the Court rely-
ing on nothing more than subjective and unexamined social judgments in affirming a 
discriminatory law. 
 6 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442–47 (1985) (conclud-
ing, after such an analysis, that the mentally retarded were not a suspect class). 
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ed to force reasoned analysis,7 the vast majority of equal protection 
claims are subject to deferential rational basis review—a level of scru-
tiny that affirmatively shuns reasoned analysis in the name of federal-
ism and separation of powers.  By enumerating specific areas of equal 
protection concern, suspect classification analysis and the tiers-of-
scrutiny framework create all other claims as presumptively not of 
concern.  Thus, it is questionable what work heightened scrutiny is 
really doing for the Court in terms of prompting critical analysis of 
the dynamics of invidious discrimination. 
B.  Suspect Classification Analysis in Context 
A brief background in equal protection jurisprudence provides a 
necessary foundation for the contentions of this Article.  Suspect clas-
sification analysis and the tiers-of-scrutiny framework are the primary 
doctrinal features of modern equal protection jurisprudence and are 
the primary mechanisms for filtering equal protection claims.8  Ulti-
mately, the fate of any given equal protection claim depends largely 
on the level of scrutiny assigned to review the challenged law.9  Levels 
of scrutiny, in turn, come in essentially two varieties:  rational basis 
review and heightened scrutiny. 
Rational basis review is the default level of scrutiny in equal pro-
tection cases.10  Where a law implicates neither a suspect classification 
nor a fundamental right, the Court will apply rational basis review, 
which asks only whether the discriminatory classification employed by 
the challenged law is rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
interest.11  Unsurprisingly, plaintiffs overwhelmingly lose under this 
standard.12 
 
 7 See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725–26 (1982) (“The purpose of 
[heightened scrutiny] is to assure that the validity of a classification is determined 
through reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, 
often inaccurate, assumptions . . . .”). 
 8 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 717–23 (3d ed. 2009). 
 9 Id. at 719–21. 
 10 Id. at 723. 
 11 See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (applying rational basis 
review to a local economic regulation for this reason). 
 12 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, at 724 (explaining that plaintiffs lose so often in such in-
stances because a challenger to a law analyzed under the rational basis test has the bur-
den of proving that there is no rational basis for the law and that a law will be upheld un-
der that test if there is any conceivable legitimate purpose for the law, even if that was not 
the government’s actual purpose in enacting the law).  But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 
620, 631–32 (1996) (striking down Amendment 2 of the Colorado Constitution under ra-
tional basis review). 
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The term “heightened scrutiny” refers to both strict scrutiny and 
intermediate scrutiny, with strict scrutiny being the more demanding 
of the two standards.  The Court applies strict scrutiny in reviewing 
laws that implicate a suspect classification or a fundamental right,13 
while the Court applies intermediate scrutiny to cases involving so-
called quasi-suspect classifications.14  The two standards are formulat-
ed differently:  strict scrutiny requires that the discriminatory classifi-
cation be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest; in-
termediate scrutiny requires that the discriminatory classification be 
substantially related to an important state interest.15  Minor semantic 
distinctions aside, the two forms of heightened scrutiny are more 
alike than different in that a plaintiff’s chances of prevailing are 
much greater under either of these forms of heightened review, as 
compared to deferential rational basis review.16 
Most significantly, under either form of heightened scrutiny, the 
burden is on the government to provide a real and credible justifica-
tion for the discriminatory law, and the justification must be 
weighty.17  By contrast, under rational basis review, the burden is on 
the plaintiff to prove the absence of any legitimate basis for the law, 
and legitimate state interests can be relatively trivial.18  In addition, 
under rational basis review, the Court is free to imagine justifications 
for the law, regardless of whether the legislature actually considered 
 
 13 E.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
 14 E.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
 15 See, e.g., id. (applying the intermediate scrutiny standard); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 
432–33 (1984) (applying strict scrutiny). 
 16 But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding a law under strict scrutiny 
that classified on the basis of race in the context of college admissions); Tuan Anh Ngu-
yen v. Immigration & Nationalization Servs., 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (upholding a law, under 
intermediate scrutiny, that classified on the basis of gender in the context of determining 
the citizenship of children born out of wedlock). 
 17 See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (“Under strict scrutiny, the govern-
ment has the burden of proving that racial classifications ‘are narrowly tailored measures 
that further compelling governmental interests.’” (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995))); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 
(1982) (requiring that government action based on sex, to withstand intermediate scruti-
ny, must establish an “exceedingly persuasive justification” (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. 
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979))). 
 18 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“Public safety, public health, morality, 
peace and quiet, law and order—these are some of the more conspicuous examples of 
the traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs.  Yet they merely illus-
trate the scope of the power and do not delimit it.”). 
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or advanced those justifications.19  For these reasons, rational basis re-
view has been criticized as bordering on meaningless.20 
Understandably, equal protection plaintiffs are eager to have 
some form of heightened scrutiny applied to their claims.  And sus-
pect classification21 analysis is the gatekeeper to heightened scrutiny.22  
As a result, equal protection plaintiffs frequently argue that the social 
group to which they belong ought to be considered a suspect classifi-
cation.23 
Suspect classification analysis and the tiers-of-scrutiny framework 
have been around for quite a while and have come to seem like inevi-
table features of equal protection law.24  Indeed, litigants have little 
incentive to attempt to challenge these doctrinal structures;25 instead, 
their best approach is to make arguments within them.26  And while 
 
 19 See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (noting that “statutory discrimina-
tion[s]” subject to rational basis review will be upheld if “any state of facts reasonably may 
be conceived” to justify them). 
 20 See Scott H. Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1, 33 (1980) 
(arguing that such open-ended requirements allow for justifications that are too abstract 
for proper evaluation). 
 21 Although proving that a challenged law burdens a fundamental right is an alternative 
means of achieving strict scrutiny, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 
432, 440 (1985), this Article focuses exclusively on the suspect classification prong of the 
heightened scrutiny analysis. 
 22 Described in greater length below, suspect classification analysis essentially asks whether 
the group targeted by a law has been historically subjected to unfair prejudice, such that 
laws targeting the group are more likely to be motivated by prejudice and should be sub-
ject to more rigorous judicial scrutiny as a result.  See Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect 
Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 138 (2011) (“There is at least superficial con-
sensus for the basic premise of equal protection law:  courts should be skeptical of—and 
should scrutinize more carefully—classifications involving politically powerless groups 
that have historically been discriminated against.”).  Thus, the focus of suspect classifica-
tion analysis is on the nature (some would say worthiness) of the group being discrimi-
nated against, rather than on the nature of the government discrimination. 
 23 See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (analyzing 
the argument that heightened scrutiny should be applied to a law that classifies on the 
basis of sexual orientation); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Is Political Powerlessness a Re-
quirement for Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny?, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 10 (2010) (suggest-
ing that those belonging to other social groups, such as transgender and intersex individ-
uals, may similarly seek heightened review of laws classifying on the basis of gender or 
gender expression). 
 24 See Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 893–95 
(2012) (tracing the development of the tiers-of-scrutiny framework back to at least the 
1960s). 
 25 See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 524 (2004) 
(“[L]itigators of equal protection cases before the Court have not generally pressed for 
anything other than standard application of the three tiers.”). 
 26 See Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal Protection Doctrine?, 
43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1079–80 (2011) (“The familiar tiered framework for judicial anal-
ysis means that the results in equal protection cases will almost always depend on the abil-
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myriad scholars have parsed, rationalized, and criticized these doctri-
nal structures, in some ways, the volume of critique has added to the 
sense that those structures are inevitable and fixed.27 
But, upon closer examination, we can see that the evolution of 
suspect classification analysis and the tiers-of-scrutiny framework was 
very much historically contingent and arguably irrational.  From its 
unholy origins to its fitful evolution, suspect classification analysis is 
more Frankenstein’s monster than a creature of rational construc-
tion.28  And, indeed, there is an emerging consensus that suspect clas-
sification analysis and the tiers-of-scrutiny framework are broken, in 
need of repair if not complete abandonment.29 
The question posed by the Article is this:  are the doctrinal struc-
tures of modern equal protection analysis equipped for the task of 
identifying and addressing contemporary prejudices?  The initial an-
swer is “no.”  But there is promise latent in the largely unexamined 
transcendent values of the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence—
values that this Article seeks to unearth and solidify in doctrinal form. 
This Article contends that, despite the many flaws in the whole of 
equal protection doctrine, including suspect classification analysis, it 
is possible to step back and read the Court’s seminal suspect classifi-
cation cases not for the specific doctrinal mechanisms each introduc-
es, but for evidence of transcendent equal protection values that can 
provide clear guidance in revising existing doctrinal mechanisms to 
meet the challenges facing this body of law.  Specifically, this revived 
doctrine can cure the most serious ills of equal protection jurispru-
dence:  meaningless rational basis review,30 the symmetry problem,31 
and the Court’s resistance to expanding categorical heightened scru-
 
ity to convince a court that there is a racial or gender classification present or discrimina-
tion with regard to a fundamental right.”). 
 27 Id. at 1087–88. 
 28 MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN, OR, THE MODERN PROMETHEUS (Marilyn Butler ed., Ox-
ford Univ. Press 1994) (1818); DAVID J. SKAL, SCREAMS OF REASON:  MAD SCIENCE AND 
MODERN CULTURE 33 (1998) (“The Frankenstein myth had its origins in the nineteenth-
century Romantic rebellion against scientific rationalism . . . .”). 
 29 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 22, at 173–74 (concluding that under the tiered framework, 
“the factors used in its analysis are ambiguous and inconsistent” and that this “test risks 
unprincipled results and thwarts equality under the law”). 
 30 See Goldberg, supra note 25, at 482 (arguing that application of the rational basis standard 
has “waver[ed] between its typical deference to government decisionmaking and the oc-
casional insistence on meaningful review”); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 747, 756 (2011) (“The words ‘scrutiny’ and ‘review’ suggest an examination 
rather than a result.  Yet in this jurisprudence, looks can kill.”). 
 31 Strauss, supra note 22, at 168–69.  Strauss asserts that the Court’s symmetry in applying 
strict scrutiny to protect, for example, whites as well as blacks, or men as well as women, 
constitutes a rejection of the criteria altogether.  Id. 
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tiny review.32  Furthermore, such a doctrinal mechanism can be as-
sembled from what we already have before us in terms of Supreme 
Court precedent, without disavowing what has come before but also 
without being unduly constrained by past missteps. 
To elaborate on this thesis, Part I of the Article retells the story of 
suspect classification analysis in a way that denaturalizes its evolution 
and questions its inevitability.  Part II analyzes the exiting critiques of 
suspect classification analysis, which attempt to rationalize, explain, 
or disassemble the framework, but which stop short of questioning its 
fundamental legitimacy.  Part III exposes deeper problems with these 
doctrinal frameworks and then performs an alternative reading of the 
precedent that traces the transcendent equal protection values sub-
merged within the piecemeal development of suspect classification 
analysis.  Part III goes on to present an alternative doctrinal frame-
work that expresses these values.  
I.  MISSTEPS 
From one perspective, contemporary equal protection jurispru-
dence, characterized by suspect classification analysis and the tiers-of-
scrutiny framework, begins and ends with Plessy v. Ferguson.33  It begins 
there because Plessy demonstrates the abject failure of deferential ra-
tional basis review—that is, of an unreflective “reasonableness” stand-
ard—in detecting contemporary prejudices.  That the Court later de-
veloped more rigorous forms of scrutiny to be applied when there 
was reason to believe that prejudice was afoot is an implicit admission 
of the profound failure of rational basis review.  And yet the Court 
applies heightened scrutiny in very few cases and continues to apply 
deferential rational basis review—the standard employed in Plessy—to 
the remainder.  In this way, contemporary equal protection jurispru-
dence ends with Plessy because the Court continues to apply Plessy-like 
rational basis review to the vast majority of equal protection claims. 
This Part discusses the failure of rationality as manifest in Plessy, 
and the Court’s initial efforts to discern and justify different levels of 
judicial scrutiny for different types of equal protection claims as a re-
sponse to that failure.  It then examines suspect classification analysis’ 
sudden and brief rise to fame. 
 
 32 Yoshino, supra note 30, at 748.  Yoshino observed that the Court has failed to 
acknowledge new suspect classes, and limited protection of existing classes, due to plural-
ism anxiety.  Id.  Yoshino further claims that as it related to Equal Protection, the cannon 
of heightened scrutiny is “closed.”  Id. at 757. 
 33 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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It further describes how, contrary to what one might expect, the 
Court did not articulate a comprehensive suspect classification analy-
sis in the context of race discrimination.  Indeed, although race is the 
paradigmatic suspect classification,34 the reasons for designating it so 
have never been fully examined or articulated by the Court.  Instead, 
we must turn to the Court’s awkward and pained recognition of 
quasi-suspect classifications, as well as its decisions rejecting claims to 
suspect classification status, to better understand the normative prin-
ciples underlying the concept. 
A.  Plessy v. Ferguson and the Failure of Rationality 
Plessy is best known for establishing the “separate but equal” doc-
trine that was later repudiated by the Court in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation.35  Plessy is also well known for Justice John Marshall Harlan’s 
dissent, in which he famously claimed, “[o]ur Constitution is color-
blind”36—a turn of phrase that some have taken as articulating a post-
race democratic ideal and that others have taken as a component of a 
deeply racist jurisprudential philosophy.37 
Plessy is perhaps less well known for the precise reasoning that the 
Court employed to reach its conclusion, including its reliance on a 
prototype of traditional deferential rational basis review.  The facts of 
Plessy are familiar.  At issue was a Louisiana state law stating that “all 
railway companies carrying passengers in their coaches in this State, 
shall provide equal but separate accommodations for the white, and 
colored races,” although the law made a generous exception for 
“nurses attending children of the other race.”38  The law further re-
quired railway personnel to enforce this segregation.39  Homer Plessy, 
who was “seven eighths Caucasian and one eighth African blood[,] 
 
 34 See, e.g., Ian Haney López & Michael A. Olivas, Jim Crow, Mexican Americans, and the Anti-
Subordination Constitution:  The Story of Hernandez v. Texas, in RACE LAW STORIES 273, 291 
(Rachel F. Moran & Devon Wayne Carbado eds., 2008) (referring to African Americans 
as the “quintessential constitutional out-group”). 
 35 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 36 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 37 See EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS:  COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND THE 
PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 1–4 (4th ed. 2014) (discussing how “col-
or-blind racism” became the “dominant racial ideology as the mechanisms and practices 
for keeping blacks and other racial minorities ‘at the bottom of the well’ changed”); see 
also Jerry Kang & Kristin Lang, Seeing Through Colorblindness:  Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 
UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010). 
 38 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 540–41 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 39 Id. at 540–41. 
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that the mixture of colored blood was not discernable in him,” chal-
lenged the law by claiming a seat in the car reserved for whites.40 
The Court interpreted the scope of the Equal Protection Clause 
very narrowly, in particular distinguishing between equality in the le-
gal versus social spheres.41  The Court further noted that racial segre-
gation within the social sphere was firmly within the police power.42  
This type of routine, presumptively permissible segregation included 
segregation in schools and anti-miscegenation laws.43  The Court cited 
abundant precedent approving of such arrangements.44 
Thus, the Plessy Court articulated a vision of judicial deference to 
legislative action that still guides the Court today.  As a general prop-
osition, the Court will not involve itself in matters within the states’ 
police power.  This expresses a commitment to principles of both 
federalism and separation of powers.  Those commitments are ex-
pressed through application of deferential rational basis review—that 
is, the Court declaring that it will go no further than to ask whether a 
particular state law is “reasonable.” 
The Court’s application of this standard to the racial segregation 
challenged in Plessy clearly demonstrates that such deferential review 
is incapable of identifying and addressing contemporary prejudices.  
Specifically, Homer Plessy argued that if the Court permitted laws 
segregating passengers in railroad cars, then states would be free to 
pass legislation mandating pervasive markers of segregation through-
out social intercourse (a classic “slippery slope” argument).45  The 
 
 40 Id. at 541. 
 41 Id. at 544 (“The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equal-
ity of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been in-
tended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished 
from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to ei-
ther.”).  Reva Siegel has detailed the conceptual underpinnings of the substantive reason-
ing in the case.  See Siegel, supra note 3, at 1126–27. 
 42 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544 (“Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places 
where they are liable to be brought into contact . . . have been generally, if not universal-
ly, recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their 
police power.”). 
 43 Id. at 545. 
 44 The Court’s deference to those matters within the police power is significant.  Seventy-
one years later, in Loving v. Virginia, the Court would recognize that the mere fact that an 
area of regulation was traditionally within the police power did not immunize laws from 
equal protection review.  See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967).  But at the time of 
Plessy, there was a fundamentally different understanding of the relationship between 
state power and the mandate of the Equal Protection Clause.  Plessy, 163 U.S. at 548. 
 45 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 549–50 (“[I]t is also suggested by the learned counsel for the plaintiff in 
error that the same argument that will justify the state legislature in requiring railways to 
provide separate accommodations for the two races will also authorize them to require 
separate cars to be provided for people whose hair is of a certain color, or who are aliens, 
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Court had little difficulty responding to this contention:  “The reply 
to all this is that every exercise of the police power must be reasona-
ble, and extend only to such laws as are enacted in good faith for the 
promotion for the public good, and not for the annoyance or oppres-
sion of a particular class.”46  The Court was confident in its ability to 
separate reasonable regulations from measures designed to oppress.  
In retrospect, this confidence was unwarranted. 
Plessy has been criticized as “wrong the day it was decided”47 and 
an expression of a morally bankrupt philosophy:  that it was permissi-
ble in our democracy for a dominant group to harness the public 
laws toward the end of controlling the social circumstances of a sub-
ordinate group.48  But another way of viewing Plessy is as a failure of 
judicial process—specifically, the failure to develop a legal test that 
would force the members of the Court to look beyond what seemed 
familiar and reasonable, and instead engage in a critical analysis of 
whether the law at issue violated the central directive of the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
From this perspective, Plessy, more than any other case (certainly 
more than Carolene Products49), explains why the Court would ulti-
mately turn to varying levels of scrutiny in an effort to produce more 
just decisions:  because we are not the rational beings we suppose 
ourselves to be.  Across-the-board deference to legislative judgments, 
tested against only a standard of “reasonableness,” did not give mean-
ing to equal protection guarantees in Plessy, nor did it produce just 
results.  Stated another way, deferential rational basis review provides 
no resistance to the logic of contemporary prejudice.  It is not a rea-
son-forcing analysis.50  But the Court’s response to this realization was 
 
or who belong to certain nationalities, or to enact laws requiring colored people to walk 
upon one side of the street, and white people upon the other, or requiring white men’s 
houses to be painted white, and colored men’s black, or their vehicles or business signs to 
be of different colors, upon the theory that one side of the street is as good as the other, 
or that a house or vehicle of one color is as good as one of another color.”). 
 46 Id. at 550. 
 47 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992) (joint opinion of 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). 
 48 Id. 
 49 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).  As discussed below, the 
Court’s decision in Carolene Products is widely credited as the origin of suspect classifica-
tion analysis and the tiers-of-scrutiny framework. 
 50 See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING:  THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 178–81 (2006) 
(discussing the concept of “reason-forcing conversations”).  Further, the Court does not 
always engage in the entire rational basis review.  “[T]he standard’s emphasis on defer-
ence at times leads courts to skip over the required step of evaluating the link between 
that permissible goal and the government’s action.”  Goldberg, supra note 25, at 490.  In 
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not, as it might have been, to abandon rational basis review altogeth-
er in evaluating facially discriminatory laws.  Rather, over several dec-
ades, the Court set about a tenuous process of discerning between 
groups that deserved more judicial protection versus those that did 
not.  The groups that did not deserve such protection would contin-
ue to be subject to Plessy-style rational basis review. 
B.  Carolene Products and Its Surprising Progeny 
It was not the Court’s concise and clear-headed decision in Brown 
v. Board of Education51 that redeemed the sins of Plessy.  Of course, 
Brown corrected Plessy on the level of substantive doctrine—rejecting 
the theory that “separate” could be “equal” in any meaningful 
sense—but it did not correct the Plessy Court’s failures of judicial 
epistemology—that is, failures in the Court’s way of knowing or iden-
tifying the presence of invidious discrimination.  Notably, Brown did 
not engage in suspect classification analysis or apply any form of 
heightened scrutiny.  Rather, Brown is more properly understood as 
representing a turning point in social consensus and “scientific un-
derstanding” about race, race segregation, and segregation’s symbolic 
and social effects.52  Stated another way, what changed between Plessy 
and Brown was the social consensus about the permissibility of perva-
sive race segregation.  The Court’s doctrinal mechanisms for detect-
ing the presence of invidious discrimination were not examined or 
changed. 
Rather than being based in Brown or any of the seminal race cases, 
the most prominent doctrinal features of contemporary equal protec-
tion jurisprudence—suspect classification analysis and the tiers of 
scrutiny—trace their intellectual heritage back to a law-clerk-drafted53 
footnote in a six-page decision about filled milk.54  What is filled milk, 
you ask, and why is it important to equal protection law?  Filled milk 
 
other words, in the spirit of deference, once a court analyzes the sufficiency of the gov-
ernmental purpose, it fails to conduct any tailoring analysis whatsoever. 
 51 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 52 Suzanne Goldberg notes that “the suspect classification tier gained its early foothold at a 
time when a majority of the Court and significant sectors of society at large had begun to 
accept as a matter of course that racial classifications typically lacked legitimacy.”  Gold-
berg, supra note 25, at 526. 
 53 See Gerald Lebovits et al., Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 237, 304 
(2008) (“Justice Harlan Fiske Stone allowed his law clerk, Louis Lusky, to write the most 
significant footnote in Supreme Court history.”). 
 54 See also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 575 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (attrib-
uting “the genesis of heightened standards of judicial review” to Carolene Products footnote 
four). 
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is an insidious substance—starting out as skim milk to which some 
non-milk oil or fat is added so as to mimic higher quality milk or 
cream.  Indeed, this substance was viewed as so insidious that Con-
gress enacted the Filled Milk Act of 1923 in an attempt to stem its 
evils.  What does filled milk have to do with the Equal Protection 
Clause?  Nothing, really, except that the producers of said unnatural 
product argued that other unnatural products were being given pref-
erential treatment and that this constituted an unjustified discrimina-
tion.55 
Despite the focus on discrimination, the plaintiffs in Carolene 
Products did not seriously advance an equal protection claim per se.  
Still, in responding to the plaintiffs’ non-argument, the Court, in dic-
ta, briefly sketched out a basis for subjecting certain types of discrim-
ination to greater scrutiny than the deferential standard typically ap-
plied in cases of discrimination in the commercial context. 
First, the Court set out the default standard for deferential ration-
al basis review,56 which it emphasized was the applicable standard for 
cases involving commercial transactions: 
[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be 
presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial trans-
actions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of 
the facts made known or assumed it is of such a character as to preclude 
the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the 
knowledge and experience of the legislators.57 
One component of this standard becomes particularly important 
over time:  the notion that, under rational basis review, legislatures 
need not actually support their judgments with actual, record facts.58  
 
 55 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 151 (1938) (“Appellee raises no 
valid objection to the present statute by arguing that its prohibition has not been extend-
ed to oleomargarine or other butter substitutes in which vegetable fats or oils are substi-
tuted for butter fat.  The Fifth Amendment has no equal protection clause, and even that 
of the Fourteenth, applicable only to the states, does not compel their legislatures to pro-
hibit all like evils, or none.”). 
 56 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2616–17 (2012) (citing Carolene 
Prods., 304 U.S. at 144, for the rational basis standard). 
 57 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152. 
 58 See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (“[A] classification ‘must be upheld against 
equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could 
provide a rational basis for the classification.’” (quoting Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. 
Beach Commc’ns Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993))); see also id. (“A State . . . has no obliga-
tion to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification.”).  Heller is 
the case that advocates and courts cite to invoke the weakest form of rational basis review.  
Interestingly, virtually all of the cases cited in Heller for the rational basis review standard 
were cases involving discrimination in the commercial context.  Beach Communications, for 
example, was a case involving regulations affecting cable television providers.  508 U.S. at 
307. 
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Rather, the judiciary is free to presume the existence of such facts.  
Further developed in future cases, this aspect of rational basis review 
has a profound effect on litigation underneath this standard.  Specif-
ically, it relieves the legislative branch of any obligation to provide 
reasons for its decisions, permits the judiciary to engage in rank 
speculation in an effort to justify legislative action, and thereby cre-
ates a virtually insurmountable evidentiary barrier for plaintiffs at-
tacking legislative action:  proving the absence of any conceivable jus-
tification for a law.59 
In a footnote appended to this passage, the Court briefly stated 
(without deciding) that this default standard of rational basis review 
would not necessarily apply in every instance where the Court was re-
viewing state legislative action: 
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts 
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about 
repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting ju-
dicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment than are most other types of legislation. . . . 
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the 
review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial 
minorities:  whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities 
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation 
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minor-
ities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial 
inquiry.60 
It is these one-hundred-some words that gave birth to the structure of 
modern equal protection doctrine. 
From the standpoint of precedential weight, there are several sig-
nificant aspects to this passage.  First, it is clearly signaled as being 
dicta—the Court is enumerating issues that it need not decide.  Se-
cond, it was offered in a case that did not even purport to undertake 
any sort of serious equal protection analysis.  Third, the text of the 
footnote is brief and ambiguous.  Taken in context to the passage to 
which it is appended, it could be seen as drawing a fundamental dis-
tinction between laws that, on their face, distinguish between classes 
of things (e.g., “regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial 
transactions”61) and those that distinguish between classes of persons, a 
 
 59 See Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 (“[T]he burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrange-
ment to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.” (quoting Lehnhausen v. 
Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
The Lehnhausen case involved a tax code distinction between corporations and other enti-
ties.  410 U.S. at 356. 
 60 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (internal citations omitted). 
 61 Id. at 152. 
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category in which religious, racial, and other “discrete and insular” 
minorities may just be an example.  It is certainly not clear that the 
reference to religious, racial, and other “discrete and insular minori-
ties” was meant to be an exhaustive list of areas of concern. 
From its humble beginnings, the “theory” articulated in Carolene 
Products footnote four was quietly elevated to the level of core consti-
tutional doctrine, the first step, arguably, being in the following pas-
sage from Korematsu v. United States,62 where the Court declared 
(without citation to Carolene Products or any other authority): 
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which cur-
tail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.  That 
is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional.  It is to say that 
courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.  Pressing public ne-
cessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial an-
tagonism never can.63 
This was the first time the Court alluded to the notion of “suspect” 
classifications and the greater level of scrutiny the Court would apply 
to laws relying on them.64  The Court’s 1967 decision in Loving v. Vir-
ginia65 solidified race as a suspect classification to which heightened 
scrutiny should apply, but again, without invoking Carolene Products or 
performing a suspect classification analysis.66 
Indeed, the Court did not explicitly invoke Carolene Products as 
providing the basis for suspect classification analysis until 1971 (and 
even then, it did so in a cursory manner).67  Nonetheless, two years 
later, in 1973, the Court had already deemed the Carolene Products cri-
teria “traditional indicia of suspectness.”68  In a sense reflecting its 
baffling, disproportionate, and sudden impact, reminiscent of unde-
 
 62 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1944) (affirming the conviction of 
Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu for violating an order excluding persons of Japanese descent 
from a military area). 
 63 Id. at 216. 
 64 See Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 1078. 
 65 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 66 See Eskridge, supra note 23, at 5 (“In Loving v. Virginia, the Court formalized the Brown 
line of cases, holding that race is a suspect classification that can be deployed by the state 
only when necessary to serve compelling state interests.” (footnote omitted)). 
 67 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (announcing without analysis that 
aliens were a “‘discrete and insular’ minority” per Carolene Products and therefore entitled 
to “heightened judicial solicitude”). 
 68 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (referring to the “tradi-
tional indicia of suspectness”); see also Strauss, supra note 22, at 144–45 (describing the 
evolution of suspect classification analysis from being relatively uniform in the early 1970s 
but deemed “traditional” by the time of the Court’s 1973 decision in Rodriguez). 
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served celebrity status, some members of the Court came to refer to 
footnote four as “famous.”69 
Thus, rather than emerging from a thoughtful consideration of 
the meaning and purpose of the Equal Protection Clause, we see that 
the governing structures of equal protection analysis originated as an 
afterthought from an unimportant case70—indeed, a case that did not 
even purport to engage in an equal protection analysis.  It is little 
wonder, then, that suspect classification analysis does not appear to 
reflect a coherent set of values tied to the history and purpose of the 
Equal Protection Clause.  And its haphazard development in later 
years did not serve to correct this problem. 
C.  Suspect Classifications:  The Unarticulated Race Paradigm 
Race is the paradigmatic suspect classification.71  It is the classifica-
tion to which others are compared.  But the Court has never per-
formed a suspect classification analysis per se with respect to race.  
On the one hand, this makes sense, as the original historical purpose 
of the Equal Protection Clause was to protect emancipated slaves 
from invidious discrimination, such that it can be presumed that race 
classifications are generally impermissible.72  But the absence of an af-
firmative explanation of why it is presumptively invidious to discrimi-
nate on the basis of race has left a void of reasoning on the issue, in-
hibiting the Court’s ability to evaluate other claims to suspect 
classification status.  In failing to affirmatively articulate, as a matter 
of principle, why race is suspect, the Court has left the core under-
standing of suspect classifications under-theorized. 
As described above, the Court’s 1944 decision in Korematsu de-
clared race a suspect classification but did not explain why this was so.  
The plaintiff in Korematsu was described as “an American citizen of 
Japanese descent” who had been convicted of violating an order of 
the army to the effect that “all persons of Japanese ancestry” were to 
be excluded from a designated military area.73  Prior to engaging the 
merits of the plaintiff’s claim, the Court announced that “all legal re-
strictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are im-
 
 69 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 575 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 70 Ackerman, supra note 1, at 713. (“These famous words, appearing in the otherwise unim-
portant Carolene Products case . . . .”). 
 71 See, e.g., López & Olivas, supra note 34, at 291 (referring to African Americans as the 
“quintessential constitutional out-group”). 
 72 Strauss, supra note 22, at 142. 
 73 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–16 (1944). 
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mediately suspect.”74  This assertion was not supported by citation to 
any authority.  Ultimately, despite expressing this suspicion of racial 
classifications, the Court concluded that Japanese ancestry was a suf-
ficient proxy for potential “disloyalty” under the circumstances of war 
and affirmed the conviction.75 
Between Korematsu and the Court’s groundbreaking decision in 
Brown came an arguably equally important decision that nevertheless 
has been largely lost to the annals of history:  Hernandez v. Texas.76  
Hernandez recognized the concept of social group discrimination out-
side of/in addition to the familiar race discrimination paradigm, and 
articulated a surprisingly clear alternative vision of equal protection 
analysis—complete with a coherent evidentiary rule.  The plaintiff in 
the case, who had been a defendant in a criminal trial, claimed that 
“persons of Mexican descent” were being systematically excluded 
from jury service and that this violated the plaintiff’s equal protection 
rights.  As in Brown, the Court did not apply a suspect classification 
analysis or discuss tiers of scrutiny.  Rather, the Court stated that ex-
cluding persons belonging to a particular class from jury service was, 
in essence, a per se violation of equal protection.77 
In so holding, the Court first rejected the State of Texas’s conten-
tion that “there are only two classes—white and Negro—within the 
contemplation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”78  The Court 
acknowledged that “differences in race and color have defined easily 
identifiable groups which have at times required the aid of the courts 
in securing equal treatment under the laws.”79  In other words, clear-
ly, there was a history of discrimination based on visible race differ-
ences between African Americans and whites, and the fact of that dis-
crimination necessitated special judicial solicitude.  But that was not 
to say that this was the only type of discrimination plaguing American 
 
 74 Id. at 216. 
 75 Id. at 223–24. 
 76 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); see López & Olivas, supra note 34, at 273 (not-
ing that Hernandez, despite being the first case in which the Warren Court “set out to dis-
mantle Jim Crow segregation,” is nonetheless “almost entirely forgotten”). 
 77 “When the existence of a distinct class is demonstrated, and it is further shown that the 
laws, as written or as applied, single out that class for different treatment not based on 
some reasonable classification, the guarantees of the Constitution have been violated.”  
Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 478.  The Court’s reference to a “reasonable classification” could 
be seen as alluding to rational basis review, but in its analysis, the Court actually hewed to 
a bright line, per se rule of equal protection violation. 
 78 Id. at 477. 
 79 Id. at 478.  Although the decision focused on analogies to race discrimination, it did not 
explicitly treat the case before it as race discrimination because Mexican Americans were 
considered to be white.  See López & Olivas, supra note 34, at 293. 
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society, and the only type that required a remedy.  Rather, the Court 
recognized the possibility that discrimination might evolve and take 
new forms:  “community prejudices are not static, and from time to 
time other differences from the community norm may define other 
groups which need the same protection.”80 
Given the current disarray of the Court’s equal protection juris-
prudence, Hernandez presents a remarkably clear framework for iden-
tifying impermissible discrimination, on both a doctrinal and an evi-
dentiary level.  The Court simply asked whether the targeted group 
was a distinct social group—a question that it designated as a factual 
inquiry—and further indicated precisely how plaintiffs could prove 
this element:  “The petitioner’s  initial burden in substantiating his 
charge of group discrimination was to prove that persons of Mexican 
descent constitute a separate class [in the plaintiff’s community], dis-
tinct from ‘whites.’  One method by which this may be demonstrated 
is by showing the attitude of the community.”81  In Hernandez, the evi-
dence revealed that “residents of the community distinguished be-
tween ‘white’ and ‘Mexican.’”82  In addition, Mexican children were 
sent to segregated schools, and “[a]t least one restaurant in town 
prominently displayed a sign announcing ‘No Mexicans Served.’”83  
Spanish-speaking men were directed to the courthouse restroom re-
served for “Colored Men” by a sign that read “Hombres Aqui.”84  This 
was sufficient to establish “the existence of a class.”85 
Having proved the existence of a distinct class, the plaintiff “was 
then charged with the burden of proving discrimination,” which he 
did successfully (and straightforwardly) by pointing to the complete 
absence of Mexicans from juries in the county for some twenty-five 
years.86  The general assertions by jury commissioners that they had 
not discriminated in selecting jurors was deemed too vague to over-
come the plaintiff’s prima facie case of discrimination.87 
Hernandez articulated a radically different—and radically sim-
pler—vision for identifying when a law violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.  “Chief Justice Warren asked two questions:  if there existed a 
‘distinct class,’ and if the challenged practice amounted to ‘different 
 
 80 Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 478. 
 81 Id. at 479. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 480. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 480–81. 
 87 Id. at 481–82. 
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treatment.’”88  Compared to the factors involved in suspect classifica-
tion analysis—assessments of groups’ relative political power, or 
whether the trait defining that group is immutable—these determi-
nations are grounded in concrete evidence, accessible to the equal 
protection plaintiff, and within the competence of the judiciary to 
evaluate.  Further, Hernandez expressed a clear focus on the conse-
quences of discriminatory laws, rather than inquiring into the relative 
worthiness of different social groups for judicial protection.89 
But the insights provided by the Hernandez decision—that imper-
missible discrimination could take many forms and be directed at 
many groups—were eclipsed by the Court’s subsequent race discrim-
ination cases, which established race as the paradigmatic suspect clas-
sification at the same time that the Court avoided explaining why this 
was so.90 
From the perspective of Hernandez, Brown can be read as applying 
Chief Justice Earl Warren’s two-part test:  of course African-Americans 
were a distinct social group; the real question was whether “separate 
but equal” segregation in the context of public education meant that 
these school children were being subject to “different treatment.”  
The Plessy Court had concluded that mere segregation was not a 
problematic form of discrimination.  The Brown Court repudiated 
that view, concluding that segregation was unequal treatment of con-
cern to the Equal Protection Clause. 
Thus, the Brown Court held that segregation—particularly state-
imposed segregation—was, in and of itself, a harm sufficient to con-
stitute “different treatment” à la Hernandez and a constitutional viola-
tion.91  But nowhere in Brown did Chief Justice Warren reiterate a 
core portion of the reasoning in Hernandez:  that these concepts and 
concerns applied to differential treatment of any distinct social 
group, not just to cases of race discrimination.92  Without this angle, 
 
 88 López & Olivas, supra note 34, at 291. 
 89 Id. at 291–92 (“The Hernandez test rests on opposition to group hierarchy:  It focuses on 
status and subordination, without being distracted by the irrelevant questions of the exact 
nature of the group identity or the presence of discriminatory intent.”). 
 90 In fact, the Court has never fully explained how any classification becomes suspect.  See 
Strauss, supra note 22, at 138 (“The Supreme Court has not provided a coherent explana-
tion for precisely what factors trigger heightened scrutiny.”).  Strauss contends that the 
absence of a coherent, disciplined test enables judicial manipulation of the doctrine.  Id. 
at 140 (“The ambiguity surrounding equal protection analysis produces incoherent re-
sults.”). 
 91 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that “[s]eparate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal”). 
 92 Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 477–78.  See generally Brown, 347 U.S. at 483; Barnes & Chemerin-
sky, supra note 26, at 1074 (finding that the Court has rejected the notion that equal pro-
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Brown can easily be read as nothing more than a statement of the pre-
sumptive impermissibility of race discrimination. 
Similarly, in McLaughlin v. Florida,93 a case involving prohibitions 
against interracial cohabitation, the Court seemed to contradict Her-
nandez by suggesting that the suspectness of racial classifications was 
unique given the history and original purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.94  Because of this, race classifications were “‘constitu-
tionally suspect’ . . . and subject to the ‘most rigid scrutiny.’”95  Thus, 
the McLaughlin Court made the strong connection between suspect 
classifications and heightened scrutiny, but pinned suspect classifica-
tion status to the original purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, as 
opposed to a recognition that we as a society inevitably tend to dis-
criminate, and that those forms of discrimination evolve over time 
(the view endorsed by Hernandez). 
The Court similarly emphasized the uniqueness of race discrimi-
nation in Loving v. Virginia, all but erasing the notion advanced in 
Hernandez that forms of discrimination were subject to change and 
that all social-group discrimination was inherently problematic.  In 
defending the challenged anti-miscegenation law at issue in Loving, 
the State argued that equal protection concerns did not apply to laws 
that merely contained racial classifications where those classifications 
did not impose differential treatment in terms of the punishment 
meted out.  As a result, according to the State, the anti-miscegenation 
laws should be subject only to rational basis review.96  The Court re-
jected this “equal application” argument and the associated notion 
that laws with facial classifications should be reviewed with typical 
deference—that is, in the same manner as when evaluating “a statute 
discriminating between the kinds of advertising which may be dis-
played on trucks in New York City . . . or an exemption in Ohio’s ad 
valorem tax for merchandise owned by a non-resident in a storage 
warehouse.”97  Thus, the Loving Court cemented the connection be-
 
tection is limited to protecting blacks and that what really matters is whether the racial 
group existed within a community). 
 93 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 94 See id. at 191–92 (justifying departure from rational basis review because “we deal here 
with a classification based upon the race of the participants, which must be viewed in light 
of the historical fact that the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to elim-
inate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States”). 
 95 Id. at 192. 
 96 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967). 
 97 Id. 
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tween suspect classification designation and heightened scrutiny.98  
Like Carolene Products footnote four, this reasoning could plausibly be 
read as establishing a bright-line distinction between discrimination 
in a commercial context versus discrimination among classes of per-
sons.  But because of the heavy emphasis on the presumptive imper-
missibility of race discrimination, Loving is typically read as being lim-
ited to that narrower proposition. 
The closest the Court came to explaining the reasons why race was 
a suspect classification (beyond the historical purpose of the Four-
teenth Amendment) was by declaring the color of one’s skin irrele-
vant to determining legal—especially criminal—burdens.99 
It was not until 1971, in examining the issue of discrimination 
based on alienage, that the Court explicitly invoked Carolene Products 
and articulated something that could be called a suspect classification 
analysis.  The laws at issue in Graham v. Richardson100 excluded resi-
dent aliens from welfare benefits.  The State asserted that alienage 
was not a suspect classification akin to race and national origin, but 
the Court determined that its prior decisions “established that classi-
fications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, 
are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”101 
The Court stated simply, “Aliens as a class are a prime example of 
a ‘discrete and insular’ minority . . . for whom such heightened judi-
cial solicitude is appropriate.”102  Thus, the case tipping off the era of 
 
 98 See Eskridge, supra note 23, at 5.  Although Loving declared that race classifications must 
be subject to the “most rigid scrutiny,” Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (quoting Korematsu v. Unit-
ed States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)), the Court’s articulation of that standard does not 
comport with our contemporary understanding of strict scrutiny.  Specifically, the Court 
stated that, to be upheld, such laws “must be shown to be necessary to the accomplish-
ment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination which 
it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate.”  Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.  
The Court then concluded, “There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose inde-
pendent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification.”  Id.  Thus, 
the anti-miscegenation laws in Loving were not struck under strict scrutiny per se, but be-
cause they performed an impermissible function—expressing and enforcing unconstitu-
tional animus.  See id. (describing anti-miscegenation laws “as measures designed to main-
tain White Supremacy”); see also Pollvogt, supra note 24, at 917 (“Thus, one may read 
Loving as standing for the proposition that it is impermissible for laws to exist solely for 
the purpose of enforcing distinctions between social groups, thereby expressing the view 
that certain social groups are superior to others.”). 
 99 Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (“[T]wo members of this Court have stated that they ‘cannot con-
ceive of a valid legislative purpose . . . which makes the color of a person’s skin the test of 
whether his conduct is a criminal offense.’” (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 
198 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring))). 
100 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S 365 (1971). 
101 Id. at 371–72 (footnotes omitted). 
102 Id. at 372. 
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suspect classification analysis invoked Carolene Products footnote four 
as established doctrine, despite the novelty of this approach and 
sealed the “discrete and insular minority” concept in the pantheon of 
suspect classification criteria, without analysis or explanation. 
Thus, the story of the development of the suspect classifications is 
opaque.  The Court’s decision in Hernandez suggested the possibility 
of a robust equal protection jurisprudence that would monitor the 
laws for evolving forms of social group discrimination.  But this ap-
proach was quickly abandoned as subsequent cases emphasized race 
as a historically distinct social marker, so inherently pernicious that 
the Court never bothered to discuss why race is a problematic classifi-
cation.  This void of analysis thus left room for the Court to later de-
clare that race classifications would be subject to strict scrutiny re-
gardless of whether it was whites or racial minorities who were 
affected. 
It was not until the Court considered arguments to expand sus-
pect classification status to include other social groups that the Court 
began to articulate a more reasoned basis for granting—or denying—
this designation. 
D.  Quasi-Suspect Classifications:  Stereotype and Self-Determination 
Paradoxically, suspect classification analysis was not clearly articu-
lated around the identification of suspect classifications.  Rather, it 
was in recognizing lesser classifications (“quasi-suspect” classifica-
tions) and non-suspect classifications that the Court began to offer 
reasons for granting the designation in some cases while denying it in 
others. 
Recognizing that not every classification was always inherently 
suspect, but that rational basis review was insufficient to protect 
against some types of discrimination that were still of concern, the 
Court developed yet another category of classifications and another 
level of scrutiny:  quasi-suspect classifications, which are subject to the 
chimeric intermediate scrutiny standard.  Two classifications were ul-
timately placed in this category:  gender and illegitimacy. 
The Court’s treatment of gender discrimination perhaps best em-
bodies the Court’s ambivalence about suspect classification analysis.  
In 1971, the Court recognized that gender discrimination was of con-
cern to the Equal Protection Clause in Reed v. Reed.103  The law at issue 
in that case was an Idaho statute providing that, in the context of 
 
103 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
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choosing between otherwise equally qualified persons for the role of 
administrator of an estate, “males must be preferred to females.”104  
The Court determined that, because the statute “provides that differ-
ent treatment be accorded to the applicants on the basis of their sex; 
it thus establishes a classification subject to scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause.”105  The Court did not perform any sort of suspect 
classification analysis in this early case, but simply determined that 
the sex classification lacked a rational relationship to the goal of the 
law.106  Under this standard, the Court determined that creating a sex 
preference in order to reduce workload on the probate courts was 
“the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal 
Protection Clause.”107 
Thus, Reed at most reflected a common sense agreement that 
gender classifications were an object of concern for the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and that gender was not a valid proxy for competence to 
administer an estate.  The Court did little to support these conclu-
sions beyond stating them. 
It was not until the Court’s next major gender case, Frontiero v. 
Richardson,108 that the Court explicitly considered whether gender was 
a suspect classification.  At issue in Frontiero was a statute used to de-
termine whether a member of the military was entitled to certain 
spousal benefits.  Under the statute, male service members were enti-
tled to such benefits simply by virtue of having a wife; female service 
members had to affirmatively prove that their husbands were de-
pendent to access the same benefits. 
The plaintiff—apparently not content with the vague arbitrariness 
analysis in Reed—argued that “classifications based upon sex, like clas-
sifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin, are inher-
ently suspect and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scruti-
ny.”109  A plurality of the Court agreed, deciding that sex was a trait 
 
104 Id. at 73 (quoting IDAHO CODE § 15-314)(internal quotation marks omitted). 
105 Id. at 75. 
106 Id. at 75–76 (“The Equal Protection Clause . . . den[ies] to States the power to legislate 
that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes 
on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute.”); see also id. at 76 
(“A classification ‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of 
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all 
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’”) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. 
v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).  As suggested by its evocative title, Royster Guano Co. 
was a case dealing with discrimination in a commercial (tax) context against a fertilizer 
producer.  253 U.S. at 412. 
107 Reed, 404 U.S. at 76. 
108 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
109 Id. at 682 (footnotes omitted). 
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sufficiently analogous to race110 such that sex-based classifications 
were inherently suspect and should “be subjected to strict judicial 
scrutiny” as a result.111 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court first pointed to Reed, which 
it characterized as departing from traditional rational basis review.  In 
Reed, the government had justified the law at issue as reflecting a fair 
assumption that men were “as a rule more conversant with business 
affairs than . . . women.”112  Because the Reed Court (1) acknowledged 
that there was some truth to this generalization (certainly enough to 
provide a rational basis), but (2) nonetheless determined that it rep-
resented forbidden, arbitrary discrimination, the Reed Court had “de-
part[ed]” from traditional rational basis review.113  In other words, be-
cause the Reed Court “implicitly rejected appellee’s apparently 
rational explanation of the statutory scheme,”114 it must have been 
applying some form of heightened scrutiny. 
In addition to generally comparing gender to race, the Court ex-
amined what are now the recognized suspect classification criteria.  
First, it noted that “[t]here can be no doubt that our Nation has had 
a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.”115  As a result of 
pervasive, paternalistic views of women and their abilities, “our statute 
books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions be-
tween the sexes.”116  The Court conceded “that the position of women 
in America has improved markedly in recent decades” but countered 
that “because of the high visibility of the sex characteristic, women 
still face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination.”117 
Second, the Court addressed the immutability factor.  The Court 
found that, 
since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic de-
termined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabil-
ities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would 
 
110 See id. at 685 (“[T]he position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable 
to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes.”). 
111 Id. at 688. 
112 Id. at 683 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 12, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-
4)). 
113 Id. at 684. 
114 Id. at 683. 
115 Id. at 684. 
116 Id. at 685. 
117 Id. at 685–86 (footnote omitted).  Note that the fairness or unfairness of distributing legal 
burdens based on a trait over which one does not have control represents an entirely in-
dependent and distinct philosophy of invidious discrimination from an inquiry into the 
history of discrimination or political powerlessness. 
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seem to violate “the basic concept of our system that legal burdens 
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility.”118 
The Court went on to reason that sex is different than other im-
mutable traits (e.g., intelligence or physical disability) because “the 
sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or 
contribute to society.”119  Thus, such stereotypes are dangerous be-
cause they interfere with the ideal of self-determination:  “statutory 
distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously rel-
egating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without re-
gard to the actual capabilities of its individual members.”120 
Finally, in assessing the political power of women, the Court noted 
that “Congress has itself manifested an increasing sensitivity to sex-
based classifications.”121  Interestingly, the Court took this legislative 
solicitude as evidence that women lacked political power (as com-
pared to the Court’s analysis in Cleburne, where the Court interpreted 
legislative concern as a sign of the presence of a certain type of politi-
cal power).  The Court deferred to Congress’s conclusion “that classi-
fications based upon sex are inherently invidious, and this conclusion 
of a coequal branch of Government is not without significance to the 
question presently under consideration.”122 
Concluding that sex was a suspect classification, such that strict 
scrutiny should apply, the plurality found the government’s reliance 
on distinction between male and female service members vis-à-vis 
spousal benefits could not be justified by an interest as minimal as 
“administrative convenience.”123 
It is important to note that the Court conceded that the gender 
classification in Frontiero would survive rational basis review.  The gov-
ernment’s interest in expediently distributing benefits (and conserv-
ing the fisc, where possible) is patently legitimate.  Further, the pre-
sumption implicit in the classification—that wives are more likely 
dependent on their husbands than the other way around—while a 
generalization, was sufficiently precise to satisfy the “rationally relat-
ed” requirement.  Under rational basis review, it is permissible to rely 
on inaccurate stereotypes.  We can see very clearly here how suspect 
 
118 Id. at 686 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)). 
119 Id.  The focus on ability is especially poignant in thinking about people with disabilities 
and the Cleburne analysis.  If we give a blanket authorization (that is, apply rational basis 
review) to discrimination based on ability, we permit laws to disadvantage the disabled in 
areas not related to their disability and mark them as an underclass. 
120 Id. at 686–87. 
121 Id. at 687. 
122 Id. at 687–88. 
123 Id. at 688–90. 
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classification analysis and the tiers of scrutiny determine outcomes in 
equal protection cases.  The fate of the plaintiff’s claim in Frontiero 
truly depended on whether the Court could be convinced to apply 
heightened scrutiny. 
The concern expressed in Frontiero is not that gender is an entirely 
inaccurate proxy for the qualities that the government is seeking to 
regulate, but that it is nonetheless invalid because it tends to perpet-
uate harmful stereotypes.  This is an interesting take on the differ-
ence between rational basis review and heightened scrutiny.  It sug-
gests that invidious discrimination may, in fact, be rational but none-
nonetheless problematic because it perpetuates stereotypes or simply 
expresses a sentiment that we consider to be unfair.  If invidious dis-
crimination can have a rational basis, this in turn suggests that ra-
tional basis review on its own cannot effectively screen for invidious 
discrimination because what makes such discrimination invidious is 
not that the underlying presumptions are radically inaccurate, but 
the expressive function of such classifications. 
Justice Lewis Powell, joined by Justice Harry Blackmun, concurred 
in the judgment but disagreed with the plurality’s decision to deem 
sex a suspect classification.  The concurrence evidences the nascent 
concern with the multiplication of suspect classes and the effect of 
this development on the dynamics of judicial review.124  Justice Powell 
further criticized the Court for prematurely interfering in the demo-
cratic debate over the Equal Rights Amendment.125  He contended 
that premature designation of suspect classifications disrupts the bal-
ance between the judicial branch and the democratic process: 
There are times when this Court, under our system, cannot avoid a 
constitutional decision on issues which normally should be resolved by 
the elected representatives of the people.  But democratic institutions are 
weakened, and confidence in the restraint of the Court is impaired, when 
we appear unnecessarily to decide sensitive issues of broad social and po-
litical importance at the very time they are under consideration within 
the prescribed constitutional processes.126 
Thus, Justice Powell drew a connection between suspect classification 
analysis, the levels of judicial scrutiny, and a commitment to separa-
 
124 Id. at 691–92 (Powell, J., concurring) (“It is unnecessary for the Court in this case to 
characterize sex as a suspect classification, with all of the far-reaching implications of such 
a holding.”); see also Yoshino, supra note 30, at 757–58 (noting that the Supreme Court 
has not accorded heightened scrutiny to any new group based on suspect classification 
since 1977 and arguing that, due to “pluralism anxiety,” “[a]t least with respect to federal 
equal protection jurisprudence, this canon has closed”). 
125 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring). 
126 Id. 
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tion of powers that would echo through the Court’s subsequent juris-
prudence. 
In its next major gender decision, the Court retreated from equat-
ing sex discrimination to race discrimination.  In Craig v. Boren,127 the 
issue was whether young men’s128 equal protection rights were being 
violated when the State of Oklahoma denied them the right to pur-
chase “nonintoxicating” 3.2% beer while under the age of twenty-
one, when the seductive elixir was made available to women upon 
reaching the age of eighteen.129 
The Court noted that Reed had established that sex-based classifi-
cations receive equal protection scrutiny and further asserted (with-
out immediate citation, although the Court eventually referred to 
Frontiero, among other cases) that “previous cases establish that classi-
fications by gender must serve important governmental objectives 
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objec-
tives.”130  The Court also credited Reed with establishing the notion 
that laws may not rely on gender as a proxy when other, “more ger-
mane bases of classification” were available.131  The Court then asked, 
essentially, whether gender was an adequate proxy in this particular 
context.132  Specifically, the Court agreed that the purported goal of 
enhancing traffic safety was an important state interest but rejected 
the State’s statistical argument that the gender distinction “closely 
serves to achieve that objective.”133  The Court characterized the evi-
dentiary record as “unpersuasive.”  It was less a matter of the accuracy 
of the statistical surveys (the Court conceded that the statistical gen-
der disparities were “not trivial in a statistical sense”134), than a matter 
of the inquiry itself being beside the point: 
There is no reason to belabor this line of analysis.  It is unrealistic to 
expect either members of the judiciary or state officials to be well versed 
in the rigors of experimental or statistical technique.  But this merely il-
 
127 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
128 Interestingly, the male plaintiff, Craig, dropped out because he attained the age of twen-
ty-one, rendering his claim moot.  Id. at 192.  The remaining plaintiff, Whitener, was fe-
male but challenged the law as a vendor of 3.2% beer subject to penalties under the stat-
ute—not on the basis of being discriminated against because of her gender.  Id. at 192–
93. 
129 Id. at 192. 
130 Id. at 197. 
131 Id. at 198. 
132 Id. at 199 (posing the controlling question as “whether . . . the difference between males 
and females with respect to the purchase of 3.2% beer warrants the differential in age 
drawn by the Oklahoma statute”). 
133 Id. at 199–200. 
134 Id. at 201. 
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lustrates that proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a du-
bious business, and one that inevitably is in tension with the normative 
philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause.135 
Thus, the Court expressed what became a recurring theme in the 
gender cases.  It does not matter if a generalization is true or useful.  
Generalizations (at least about the genders) are always problematic in 
and of themselves.  But the Court did not articulate precisely why this 
is the case.  After alluding to unarticulated “normative” concerns, it 
merely offered:  “[T]he relationship between gender and traffic safe-
ty becomes far too tenuous to satisfy Reed’s requirement that the gen-
der-based differences be substantially related to achievement of the 
statutory objective.”136 
This piece of reasoning is a perfect demonstration of the manner 
in which scrutiny of the tailoring of a particular law (that is, whether 
the relationship between the classification and the purpose of the law 
is “too tenuous”) supplants a discussion of the normative principles at 
play. 
The Court made some effort to elaborate on these underlying 
“normative” principles in footnote twenty-two of the decision, where 
it explained by analogy that, even if there were real statistical differ-
ences between ethnic or religious groups vis-à-vis alcohol abuse, the 
Equal Protection Clause would not permit such distinctions to be 
drawn in the laws.137  But even here, the Court never precisely ex-
plained why such regulations would be offensive.  It simply noted “so-
ciety’s perception of the unfairness and questionable constitutionality 
of singling out groups to bear the brunt of alcohol regulation.”138 
It was in his concurrence to this case that Justice John Paul Ste-
vens famously expressed his fatigue with the tiers of scrutiny, stating, 
“There is only one Equal Protection Clause.”139  According to Stevens, 
the provision “does not direct the courts to apply one standard of re-
view in some cases and a different standard in other cases.”140  Justice 
Stevens then identified his reasons for finding the gender classifica-
tions at issue unconstitutional:  (1) the fact that gender is “an acci-
dent of birth,”141 such that imposing differential burdens on the basis 
of gender “would seem to violate the basic concept of our system that 
legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsi-
 
135 Id. at 204. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 208 n.22. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 211 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
140 Id. at 211–12. 
141 Id. at 212. 
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bility”;142 (2) the law was based on an abandoned “tradition of dis-
criminating against males in this age bracket”;143 and (3) the stereo-
type was “perverse” because the actual physical differences between 
men and women suggested that it was women who should have re-
stricted access to alcohol (because “males are generally heavier than 
females”).144 
Justice Stevens emphasized that the law was “not totally irrational” 
and would have survived the Court’s most deferential level of scruti-
ny.145  (Indeed, it is virtually impossible to imagine what laws—
including those based on race—would not survive if subject only to 
rational basis review, because rational basis review (1) permits reli-
ance on inaccurate stereotypes and (2) contains no mechanism for 
identifying which stereotypes we consider unfair.)146  But under a 
standard even slightly more demanding—say, one of plausibility—the 
law would necessarily fail due to the lack of correlation between the 
trait of gender and the purported goals of the statute.  Justice Stevens 
considered such an overbroad classification—burdening 100% of 
young males when only 2% were prone to violating drinking and driv-
ing laws—to amount to “an insult to all of the young men of the 
State.”147  Much like the majority opinion, Justice Stevens, in his con-
currence, conflated concerns over accuracy with concerns over reli-
ance on offensive stereotypes. 
Justice Potter Stewart also wrote separately to assert that “[t]he 
disparity created by these Oklahoma statutes amounts to total irra-
tionality,” demonstrating a rather striking lack of consensus as to the 
meaning of the term,148 while Chief Justice Warren Burger dissented, 
arguing that there was no constitutional basis for treating gender as a 
disfavored classification, and noting that, because eight of nine Jus-
tices had concluded that the law was not irrational (albeit unwise), 
the law should have been upheld under the default standard of ra-
tional basis review.149 
 
142 Id. at 212 n.2 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). 
143 Id. at 212. 
144 Id. at 212–13, 213 n.4. 
145 Id. at 213. 
146 Following Stevens’s rationale, Suzanne Goldberg claimed that “a unitary [equal protec-
tion] standard potentially would narrow the gap between the virtually assured fatal blow 
dealt to classifications under strict scrutiny and the rubber stamp regularly received by 
classifications subjected to rational basis review.”  Goldberg, supra note 25, at 491. 
147 Craig, 429 U.S. at 214 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
148 Id. at 215 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
149 Id. at 217 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
Feb. 2014] BEYOND SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS 769 
 
Justice William Rehnquist dissented as well, focusing on two 
points:  first, that it was inconsistent to apply heightened scrutiny to a 
law discriminating against men—a class that had not suffered a histo-
ry of discrimination and marginalization150; and second, that the ma-
jority had created a new level of scrutiny out of whole cloth.151  Un-
surprisingly, relying heavily on the deferential nature of traditional 
rational basis review and the statistical evidence provided by the State, 
Justice Rehnquist concluded that the laws would have survived ra-
tional basis review. 
The various opinions in Craig show the Justices struggling mightily 
over the proper application of equal protection principles, but this 
normative debate is deflected almost entirely onto an argument 
about the proper standard of review, rather than a discussion about 
the theory of equality underlying the provision. 
The Court’s confusion about the significance of gender discrimi-
nation and its meaning came to a head in Mississippi University for 
Women v. Hogan.152  In that case, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote 
for a slim majority to strike a nursing college’s policy of excluding 
male students.  Because the policy “expressly discriminate[d] among 
applicants on the basis of gender,” it was subject to equal protection 
scrutiny and, in particular, the heightened level of scrutiny applicable 
to sex discrimination.153  The Court further explained, “[t]hat this 
statutory policy discriminates against males rather than against fe-
males does not exempt it from scrutiny or reduce the standard of re-
view.”154  The Court articulated the applicable standard as placing the 
burden on the state to provide an “‘exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion’ for the classification,”155 which could be met “only by showing at 
least that the classification serves ‘important governmental objectives 
and that the discriminatory means employed’ are ‘substantially relat-
ed to the achievement of those objectives.’”156  In applying this test, 
 
150 Id. at 219 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
151 Id. at 220 (“The Equal Protection Clause contains no such language, and none of our 
previous cases adopt that standard.”).  Justice Rehnquist further criticized the multiplica-
tion of standards as mere rhetoric devoid of inherent meaning.  “How is this Court to di-
vine what objectives are important?  How is it to determine whether a particular law is 
‘substantially’ related to the attainment of such objective . . . ?”  Id. at 221.  “Both of the 
phrases used are so diaphanous and elastic as to invite subjective judicial preferences or 
prejudices, . . . masquerading as judgments . . . .”  Id. 
152 Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
153 Id. at 722–723. 
154 Id. at 723. 
155 Id. at 724 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
156 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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courts are obligated to exclude “fixed notions concerning the roles 
and abilities of males and females.”157 
Here, Justice O’Connor made what is perhaps the most compel-
ling (and explicit) justification for applying heightened scrutiny and, 
in particular, the more stringent tailoring requirement associated 
with it: 
The purpose of requiring that close relationship [between the govern-
mental objective and the discriminatory means] is to assure that the va-
lidity of a classification is determined through reasoned analysis rather 
than through the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, 
assumptions about the proper roles of men and women.158 
Thus, according to Justice O’Connor, heightened scrutiny serves 
to force courts to reason through the appropriateness of relying on 
certain classifications rather than presuming their validity because 
they rest on familiar and comfortable stereotypes. 
The Court found that the policy failed both prongs of the inter-
mediate scrutiny standard.  The State offered the important state in-
terest of remedying discrimination against women, but O’Connor 
noted that women made up the vast majority of nurses both in Missis-
sippi and nationwide, giving lie to the contention that any remedy 
was needed.159  Further, because of the predominance of women in 
nursing, maintaining the school for women only “tend[ed] to per-
petuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman’s 
job.”160  Finally, the policy was not appropriately tailored to achieve its 
objectives because men were permitted to audit classes at the school 
and fully participate, such that a single-gender educational environ-
ment was not being preserved in any case.161 
The four dissenters in the case—Justices Burger, Blackmun, Pow-
ell and Rehnquist—reflected a fundamentally different perspective 
on the role of gender segregation in educational environments.  Spe-
cifically, Chief Justice Burger worried that the holding might be ex-
tended to other types of schools as well.162  Justice Blackmun lament-
ed the “rigid” approach to sex discrimination, suggesting that it 
would erode legitimate values preferences without necessarily in-
creasing equality.163  Justice Blackmun invoked the specter of con-
 
157 Id. at 724–25. 
158 Id. at 725–26. 
159 Id. at 727–29. 
160 Id. at 729. 
161 Id. at 730–31. 
162 Id. at 733 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
163 Id. at 734 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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formity,164 and Justice Powell echoed this theme.165  Specifically, Jus-
tice Powell contended—in rhetoric eerily and surely unintentionally 
reminiscent of Plessy—that “[t]he sexual segregation of students has 
been a reflection of, rather than an imposition upon, the preference 
of those subject to the policy.”166  Justice Powell further found it illog-
ical that a heightened level of judicial scrutiny, “designed to free 
women from ‘archaic and overbroad generalizations,’” would be ap-
plied to a claim of discrimination advanced by a man—in particular, 
a man who had the opportunity to attend a nursing school elsewhere 
in the state.167 
On the whole, the various opinions in the case express a deep 
ambivalence about whether gender discrimination is equally prob-
lematic in different contexts.  In another parallel to Plessy, some 
members of the Court appeared to perceive distinctions between dis-
crimination in the sphere of core legal and civil rights, as opposed to 
the social sphere. 
The Court veered back in the other direction in J.E.B. v. Alabama 
ex rel T.B.168 The issue there was whether preemptive challenges based 
on gender violated the Equal Protection Clause.  The emphasis in the 
Court’s analysis was that gender was not a valid proxy for ability.169  
The Court reasoned that heightened scrutiny applies to gender classi-
fications primarily because of the danger of stereotype: 
[T]his Court consistently has subjected gender-based classifications to 
heightened scrutiny in recognition of the real danger that government 
policies that professedly are based on reasonable considerations in fact 
may be reflective of “archaic and overbroad” generalizations about gen-
der, . . . or based on “outdated misconceptions concerning the role of 
 
164 Id. at 734–35 (“I hope that we do not lose all values that some think are worthwhile (and 
are not based on differences of race or religion) and relegate ourselves to needless con-
formity.”).  It is certainly fair to say that some may be attached to the values or tradition 
associated with single-sex educational institutions, but Justice Blackmun’s sentiment is 
remarkably unreflective.  It does not offer any limiting principle—a mechanism for dis-
tinguishing between those traditions that are benign versus those that are oppressive. 
165 Id. at 735 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s opinion bows deeply to conformity.”). 
166 Id. at 737; see also id. at 740 (noting that the policy “seeks to accommodate the legitimate 
personal preferences of those desiring the advantages of an all-women’s college”).  The 
Court in Plessy minimized the state’s role in imposing legally sanctioned segregation by 
stating that it reflected private preferences that the races remain separate.  Plessy v. Fer-
guson, 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896). 
167 Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 740 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); id. at 741 
(“By applying heightened equal protection analysis to this case, the Court frustrates the 
liberating spirit of the Equal Protection Clause.” (footnote omitted)). 
168 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
169 Id. at 129 (“We hold that gender, like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror compe-
tence and impartiality.”). 
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females in the home rather than in the ‘marketplace and world of ide-
as.’”170 
The Court rejected the government’s attempt to distinguish be-
tween race discrimination and sex discrimination.171  The Court stated 
that “[w]hile the prejudicial attitudes toward women in this country 
have not been identical to those held toward racial minorities, the 
similarities between the experiences of racial minorities and women, 
in some contexts, ‘overpower those differences.’”172 
The Court then went on to state that the question under height-
ened scrutiny was “whether discrimination on the basis of gender in 
jury selection substantially furthers the State’s legitimate interest in 
achieving a fair and impartial trial.”173  The Court further demanded 
that the state offer an “exceptionally persuasive justification” for the 
discrimination.174  The state offered that an all-male jury might be 
more sympathetic to the male defendant in the case at hand.  To this, 
the Court responded:  “We shall not accept as a defense to gender-
based preemptory challenges ‘the very stereotype the law con-
demns.’”175 
Echoing sentiments first articulated in Brown, the Court expressed 
concern that, when the government relied on and enforced stereo-
types, this resulted in a larger symbolic harm to the affected individu-
als, to society, and to the structures of government itself. 
Discrimination in jury selection, whether based on race or gender, 
causes harm to the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors 
who are wrongfully excluded from participation in the judicial pro-
cess. . . . The community is harmed by the State’s participation in the 
perpetuation of invidious group stereotypes and the inevitable loss of 
confidence in our judicial system that state-sanctioned discrimination in 
the courtroom engenders.176 
 
170 Id. at 135 (citations omitted). 
171 Id. at 136.  The government had argued that “‘gender discrimination in this coun-
try . . . has never reached the level of discrimination’ against African-Americans, and 
therefore gender discrimination, unlike racial discrimination, is tolerable in the court-
room.”  Id. at 135. 
172 Id. at 135. 
173 Id. at 136–37. 
174 Id. at 137. 
175 Id. at 138. 
176 Id. at 140 (“When state actors exercise preemptory challenges in reliance on gender ste-
reotypes, they ratify and reinforce prejudicial views of the relative abilities of men and 
women.”); see also id. at 142 (“Striking individual jurors on the assumption that they hold 
particular views simply because of their gender is ‘practically a brand upon them, affixed 
by the law, an assertion of their inferiority.’”). 
Feb. 2014] BEYOND SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS 773 
 
The dissenters, Justices Scalia and Rehnquist, expressed a funda-
mental disagreement that reliance on stereotype—no matter how ac-
curate—was always impermissible.177 
In United States v. Virginia,178 the Court attempted to tackle head-on 
the tension between the harm of stereotype and the “reality” of dif-
ferences between the sexes.  The female plaintiffs challenged their 
exclusion from the all-male Virginia Military Institute.  The Court be-
gan by noting that J.E.B. and Mississippi University for Women stood for 
the proposition that gender discrimination must be supported by an 
“exceedingly persuasive justification.”179  This heightened scrutiny was 
merited, the Court explained, by the nation’s “long and unfortunate 
history of sex discrimination.”180  Applying rational basis review to 
gender discrimination did not take gender discrimination seriously 
enough and permitted unfettered reliance on stereotype (due to the 
minimal tailoring requirements of rational basis review).181  From this 
perspective, reliance on stereotypes or generalizations (permissible 
under rational basis review) interferes with individual self-
determination.  According to the Court, women must be afforded 
“equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to 
society based on their individual talents and capacities.”182 
But the Court noted that gender classifications need not be 
“equat[ed] . . . for all purposes, to classifications based on race or na-
tional origin”183 for there to be meaningful review of gender discrimi-
nation.  Specifically, the Court reiterated the “exceedingly persuasive 
justification” standard, that the burden of meeting that standard was 
on the state, and that this justification required the state to show that 
the classification was substantially related to an important govern-
mental objective.184  In contrast to justifications offered under rational 
basis review, “[t]he justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or 
 
177 See id. at 156 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“The two sexes differ, both biologically and, to 
a diminishing extent, in experience.  It is not merely ‘stereotyping’ to say that these dif-
ferences may produce a difference in outlook which is brought to the jury room.”); id. at 
158 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Even if sex was a remarkably good predictor in certain cases, 
the Court would find its use in preemptories unconstitutional.”). 
178 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
179 Id. at 531. 
180 Id. (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)). 
181 Id. at 531–33 (noting that gender discrimination was previously acceptable if it had “any 
‘basis in reason,’” but that since Reed, relying on generalizations about women was no 
longer permissible). 
182 Id. at 532. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 532–33. 
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invented post hoc in response to litigation.”185  Finally, the justification 
“must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different tal-
ents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.”186  These 
standards, then, stood alone as the means to protect from gender-
based discrimination and did not rely on comparisons to race-based 
analyses. 
Additionally, the Court marked a key distinction between race dis-
crimination and gender discrimination.  While race discrimination 
was always presumptively invalid, gender was not “a proscribed classi-
fication.”187  This is because there were recognized “inherent differ-
ences”188 between the genders.  The Court noted that “[p]hysical dif-
ferences between men and women . . . are enduring.”189  On this basis, 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for the Court, attempted to im-
port normative principles, drawing a distinction between gender clas-
sifications that served to denigrate women versus those that sought to 
further women’s equality.190 
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the 
majority for muddying the intermediate scrutiny standard by adding 
the “exceedingly persuasive justification” language.191  The Chief Jus-
tice also would not have evaluated the state’s actions prior to recent 
decisions regarding gender-based classifications because the state had 
no reason to believe that it was violating the Constitution until re-
cently.  “Long after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
well into this century, legal distinctions between men and women 
were thought to raise no question under the Equal Protection 
Clause.”192  Chief Justice Rehnquist further questioned the lack of dis-
tinction drawn between excluding women from jury service and ex-
cluding them from an all-male educational institution, reiterating the 
notion expressed in Plessy that concerns about discrimination might 
apply only to some types of government action and not others. 
In a more pointed critique, Justice Scalia accused the majority of 
“drastically revis[ing] our established standards for reviewing sex-
 
185 Id. at 533. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 See id. at 533–34 (asserting that “inherent differences” between the sexes may not be used 
for “denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individu-
al’s opportunity.”). 
191 Id. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
192 Id. at 560. 
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based classifications.”193  Justice Scalia agreed that social institutions—
historical and contemporary—are permeated with prejudice.  But ra-
ther than being a call to judicial intervention, such prejudices could 
be dealt with by our democratic political system:  “The virtue of a 
democratic system with a First Amendment is that it readily enables 
the people, over time, to be persuaded that what they took for grant-
ed is not so, and to change their laws accordingly.”194  Interestingly, 
this stance rejects the one portion of Carolene Products footnote four 
that is relatively clear:  the observation that sometimes, certain social 
groups are compromised vis-à-vis their participation in the political 
process, and the judiciary must take care to notice marginalizing laws 
of this nature.  Justice Scalia later cited footnote four for the proposi-
tion that women were not a suspect class because they were neither a 
discrete and insular minority nor politically powerless.195 
Justice Scalia went on to mock the “scientific” tiers-of-scrutiny 
framework as an artifice that served to disguise judicial activism.196  
Scalia’s chief complaint, however, was that the judiciary should work 
“to preserve our society’s values . . . , not to revise them.”197 
The persistent theme in the gender cases is ambivalence and con-
fusion over whether reliance on stereotype is ever permissible and, if 
so, whether the Court should be guided by the accuracy of the stereo-
type (i.e., whether it is based on “real differences”) or the symbolic 
harm associated with it. 
In contrast to the ambivalence expressed around the quasi-suspect 
classification of gender, the Court’s vision regarding the other quasi-
suspect classification—illegitimacy—was quite clear.  In Levy v. Louisi-
ana,198 the Court considered a wrongful death statute that precluded 
recovery of benefits by illegitimate children.  The Court described the 
Equal Protection Clause as prohibiting invidious discrimination, 
which would be tested by asking whether “the line drawn” by the chal-
lenged law was a rational one.199 
But the Court drew a distinction between different types of legisla-
tion, noting that “[i]n applying the Equal Protection Clause to social 
 
193 Id. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
194 Id. at 567. 
195 Id. at 575 (“[T]he suggestion that they are incapable of exerting . . . political power 
smacks of the same paternalism that the Court so roundly condemns.”). 
196 Id. at 567 (“These tests are no more scientific than their names suggest, and a further el-
ement of randomness is added by the fact that it is largely up to us which test will be ap-
plied in each case.”). 
197 Id. at 568. 
198 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
199 Id. at 71. 
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and economic legislation, we give great latitude to the legislature in 
making classifications,”200 but that this deferential posture had not 
prevented the Court from striking down “invidious classification[s],” 
especially those touching on “basic civil rights.”201  The Court con-
cluded that the child’s status as illegitimate did not change the harm 
of losing a parent:  “We conclude that it is invidious to discriminate 
against [the mother’s illegitimate children] when no action, conduct, 
or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was done 
to the mother.”202  In other words, legal burdens should follow re-
sponsibilities, and children can never be held responsible for the cir-
cumstances of their birth. 
The Court echoed this moral clarity several years later in Weber v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.203  At issue in Weber was the constitutionali-
ty of a state law that prevented unacknowledged illegitimate children 
from recovering benefits under the workman’s compensation system.  
The Court first confirmed that applicable precedent framed the in-
quiry as whether “the fact of a child’s birth out of wedlock” bore any 
“reasonable relation” to the purpose of the statute at issue.204  This 
was arguably still rational basis review in form, but the Court posed a 
more pointed question in practice.  The Court asked whether the dif-
ference between legitimate and illegitimate children mattered with 
respect to the child’s interest in the benefit provided by the law—which was 
to be shielded, at least to some extent, from the consequences of pa-
rental injury or loss. 
Purportedly applying rational basis review to the challenged law, 
the Court noted the state’s interest “in protecting ‘legitimate family 
relationships.’”205  The Court acknowledged that “the regulation and 
protection of the family unit have indeed been a venerable state con-
cern.”206  The Court did not “question the importance of that inter-
est” but did question “how the challenged statute will promote it.”207  
Protecting the family unit is one matter; expressing a bare preference 
for one type of family is another. 
The Court ultimately concluded that “[t]he state interest in legit-
imate family relationships is not served by the statute.”208  “The inferi-
 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 72 (footnote omitted). 
203 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). 
204 Id. at 168. 
205 Id. at 173 (citation omitted). 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. at 175. 
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or classification of dependent unacknowledged illegitimates bears, in 
this instance, no significant relationship to those recognized purposes 
of recovery which workmen’s compensation statutes commendably 
serve.”209  In other words, despite the valid governmental interest in 
promoting marriage and childbirth in marriage, the Court concluded 
that punishing or excluding one group of children from important 
benefits does not advance the interests of the other. 
In the penultimate passage of the decision, the Court recognized 
that punishing “the inferior classification” of children was not only 
ineffective, but profoundly unfair:  “The status of illegitimacy has ex-
pressed through the ages society’s condemnation of irresponsible li-
aisons . . . . But visiting this condemnation of the head of an infant is 
illogical and unjust.”210 
Thus, the Court specifically disavowed the legislative technique of 
denying benefits to children in an effort to control the conduct of 
their parents: 
[I]mposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic 
concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship 
to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.  Obviously, no child is re-
sponsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffec-
tual—as well as an unjust—way of deterring the parent.211 
In 1977, the Court implicitly recognized that it treated classifica-
tions based on illegitimacy as quasi-suspect and that the applicable 
standard was, as with gender classifications, intermediate scrutiny.212 
The quasi-suspect classification cases illuminate three different 
concerns animating suspect classification analysis:  the validity or ac-
curacy of certain proxies; the harm of stereotype, regardless of accu-
racy; and the larger principle of correlating burdens to individual re-
sponsibility.  The Court never clearly identified, however, which if any 
of these was a guiding “normative principle” of its jurisprudence. 
 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. 
212 See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977) (holding that classifications based on 
legitimacy were not inherently suspect but that “[i]n a case like this, the Equal Protection 
Clause requires more than the mere incantation of a proper state purpose”); see also Clark 
v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (“Between these extremes of rational basis review and 
strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally has been applied to 
discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy.”); Yoshino, supra note 30, at 
757 (“[T]he last classification accorded heightened scrutiny by the Supreme Court was 
that based on nonmarital parentage in 1977.” (citing Trimble, 430 U.S. at 766–76)). 
778 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:3 
 
E.  Non-Suspect Classifications:  Differences That Matter 
The cases where the Court denies suspect classification status pro-
vide a study in contrasts.  Some of these cases are extremely superfi-
cial in their analysis, which is troubling, because once suspect classifi-
cation status is denied, the issue is unlikely to be revisited.  This 
means that the group at issue is virtually permanently excluded from 
receiving meaningful judicial review of their claims, given the general 
weakness of the rational basis standard. 
On the other side of the spectrum are cases where the Court care-
fully considers and explains why a particular group is not being ac-
corded suspect classification status, but nonetheless applies a form of 
meaningful rational basis review animated by many of the values un-
derlying the recognition of presumptively suspect classes.  It is from 
this small set of exceptional cases that one perhaps can learn the 
most about the true concerns of equal protection jurisprudence.  
Further, as explored in Part IV, these cases provide a concrete, work-
able doctrinal and evidentiary framework for giving meaningful re-
view to all equal protection claims. 
Although San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez213 is cit-
ed for the proposition that poverty is not a suspect classification,214 
the decision is not particularly helpful in understanding the Court’s 
suspect classification analysis.  The law at issue in the case—a compli-
cated series of tax regulations designed to provide adequate funding 
for school districts throughout the state—did not contain facial classi-
fications of persons, and so arguably did not present the issue square-
ly in the first place.215  Indeed, the Court’s primary criticism of the 
plaintiffs’ argument was that the classification at issue was poorly de-
fined, such that it was difficult to analyze for suspect or non-suspect 
traits.  The Court did opine that a classification based on wealth 
might be too diffuse and diverse to meet suspect classification crite-
ria.  But this was not a case where the law clearly defined a classifica-
tion of persons on its face.  Had the law, for example, denied public 
education to persons below the poverty line, the analysis surely would 
 
213 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
214 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 806 (4th ed. 2011) 
(“In San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court expressly held that poverty 
is not a suspect classification and that discrimination against the poor should only receive 
rational basis review.”). 
215 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 19 (“The case comes to us with no definitive description of the clas-
sifying facts or delineation of the disfavored class.”). 
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have taken on a different tone and likely produced a different re-
sult.216 
In assessing the plaintiffs’ contention that the Texas school fi-
nancing system burdened a suspect classification, the Court, at the 
outset, noted that lower courts, in many cases, had deemed wealth a 
suspect classification without engaging in any principled analysis of 
the issue.217  The tone of the Court’s discussion very much suggests 
that it saw its role as reining in power-drunk lower courts that were 
finding new suspect classifications left and right.  Thus, the Court was 
compelled to analyze “the hard threshold questions” of whether “the 
class of disadvantaged ‘poor’ [can] be identified or defined in cus-
tomary equal protection terms.”218 
After considering the possible definitions of the affected class, the 
Court concluded, 
The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of 
the traditional indicia of suspectness:  the class is not saddled with such 
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treat-
ment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to 
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political pro-
cess.219 
Significantly, this is as much an indictment of a failed evidentiary 
presentation as it is a disciplined suspect classification analysis. 
The Court also dealt summarily with the claim that age was a sus-
pect classification in its 1976 decision in Massachusetts Board of Retire-
ment v. Murgia.220  The Court determined that the aged had been sub-
ject to some discrimination, but not a sufficient amount—making this 
assertion without any citation to the factual record or precedent.221  
Further, according to the Court, the relevant age—fifty—was more 
properly characterized as middle rather than old age.  Finally, in con-
clusory fashion, the Court observed that those in old age were not a 
“discrete and insular minority” per Carolene Products footnote four.222  
 
216 Neither was this a case where the disfavored group was denied access to a right 
altogether.  Rather, the discrimination involved was relative.  Namely, children in the 
poorest school district in Texas received funding at the level of $356 per pupil, while 
children in the wealthiest school district received funding at the level of $594 per pupil.  
Id. at 13–14. 
217 Id. at 19 (“[T]he courts in these cases have virtually assumed their findings of a suspect 
classification through a simplistic process of analysis . . . .”). 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 28. 
220 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (“We need state only briefly our reasons for agreeing that strict 
scrutiny is not the proper test for [the plaintiff’s claims].”). 
221 See id. at 313. 
222 Id. 
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Rather, old age “marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out 
our normal span.”223  In the final analysis, old age was not “sufficiently 
akin to those classifications that we have found suspect.”224 
By contrast, Plyler v. Doe—while denying suspect classification sta-
tus to the plaintiffs in that case—provides detailed insight into why 
certain classifications cause concern for the Court.225  Plyler is among 
the handful of cases where the Court declined to find a suspect or 
quasi-suspect class, and therefore declined to apply heightened scru-
tiny to the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, and yet ultimately ruled 
for the plaintiffs in the case.  Thus, Plyler can be read for its use of the 
elusive “rational basis with bite” standard, but it can also be read for 
guidance on what counts as a suspect classification and why. 
The law challenged in Plyler was a Texas statute that sought to de-
ny public education to the children of undocumented immigrants.  
The federal district court in the case made several significant factual 
findings.226  First, the court determined that the law did not have “the 
purpose or effect of keeping illegal aliens out of the State of Texas.”227  
The district court found that increased immigration into the state 
“had created problems for the public schools of the State, and that 
these problems were exacerbated by the special educational needs of 
immigrant Mexican children,” although there were other sources of 
problems as well.228  Thus, “barring undocumented children from the 
schools would save money, but it would ‘not necessarily’ improve ‘the 
quality of education.’”229  Further, the district court observed that 
“without an education, these undocumented children, ‘[a]lready dis-
advantaged as a result of poverty, lack of English-speaking ability, and 
undeniable racial prejudices, . . . will become permanently locked in-
to the lowest socio-economic class.’”230 
In determining the proper level of scrutiny to apply to the chal-
lenged law, the Court reflected on the reasons why certain classifica-
tions were treated as suspect: 
Some classifications are more likely than others to reflect deep-seated 
prejudice rather than legitimate rationality in the pursuit of some legiti-
mate objective.  Legislation predicated on such prejudice is easily recog-
 
223 Id. at 313–14. 
224 Id. at 314. 
225 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
226 Id. at 207. 
227 Id. (quoting Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 575 (E.D. Tex. 1978)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
228 Id. at 207 (citing Doe, 458 F. Supp. at 575). 
229 Id. (quoting Doe, 458 F. Supp. at 577). 
230 Id. at 207–08 (quoting Doe, 458 F. Supp. at 577). 
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nized as incompatible with the constitutional understanding that each 
person is to be judged individually and is entitled to equal justice under 
the law.  Classifications treated as suspect tend to be irrelevant to any 
proper legislative goal.  Finally, certain groups, indeed largely the same 
groups, have historically been “relegated to such a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majori-
tarian political process.”  The experience of our Nation has shown that 
prejudice may manifest itself in the treatment of some groups.  Our re-
sponse to that experience is reflected in the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Legislation imposing special disabilities 
upon groups disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond their control 
suggests the kind of “class or caste” treatment that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was designed to abolish.231 
What is particularly interesting about Plyler is that, although it ul-
timately declined to grant suspect classification status, it implemented 
some of the same values (in particular, protecting individual self-
determination) discussed above in its subsequent application of ra-
tional basis review, as discussed in Part IV. 
Addressing the tension between deference and judicial concern, 
the Court noted that, at the same time that the Equal Protection 
Clause “directs that ‘all persons similarly circumstanced shall be 
treated alike,’” it “does not require things which are different in fact 
or opinion be treated in law as though they were the same.”232  Fur-
ther, “[t]he initial discretion to determine what is ‘different’ and 
what is ‘the same’ resides in the legislatures of the States.”233  In light 
of the latitude given to legislatures in this realm, the Court “seek[s] 
only the assurance that the classification at issue bears some fair rela-
tionship to a legitimate public purpose.”234 
But the Court recognized that deferential rational basis review 
does not always get the job done:  “[W]e would not be faithful to our 
obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment if we applied so defer-
ential a standard to every classification. . . . Thus we have treated as 
presumptively invidious those classifications that disadvantage a ‘sus-
pect class’ . . . .”235 
The Court next turned its attention to the class at hand.  The 
Court placed blame for the existence of the “shadow population” of 
 
231 Id. at 216 n.14 (citations omitted). 
232 Id. at 216 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at 216; see id at 217 (“With respect to such classifications, it is appropriate to enforce 
the mandate of equal protection by requiring the State to demonstrate that its classifica-
tion has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”). 
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undocumented immigrants squarely at the feet of the government, 
noting its failure to adequately enforce existing immigration laws.236 
Thus, the Court first implied that adult undocumented immi-
grants were, on some level, not entirely responsible for their circum-
stances, then further determined that the children of immigrants tru-
ly could not be held accountable for their undocumented status and 
presence in the country.   
Persuasive arguments support the view that a State may withhold its be-
neficence from those whose very presence within the United States is the 
product of their own unlawful conduct.  These arguments do not apply 
with the same force to classifications imposing disabilities on the minor 
children of such illegal entrants.237 
Because, while “[t]heir ‘parents have the ability to conform their 
conduct to social norms,’ . . . the children who are plaintiffs in these 
cases ‘can affect neither their parents’ conduct nor their own sta-
tus.’”238  “Even if the State found it expedient to control the conduct 
of adults by acting against their children, legislation directing the 
onus of a parent’s misconduct against his children does not comport 
with fundamental conceptions of justice.”239 
This is one of the clearest statements of a normative justification 
for designating suspect classifications—and, at the same time, reveals 
that the normative principle invoked has a much broader and more 
flexible application than existing rigid suspect classification analysis. 
Despite recognizing the inherent concerns with classifications that 
affect children, the Court noted that “undocumented status is not ir-
relevant to any proper legislative goal[;] [n]or is undocumented sta-
tus an absolutely immutable characteristic since it is the product of 
conscious, indeed unlawful, action.”240 
While denying that the subject classification was suspect, the 
Court continuously reiterated reasons to be concerned about Texas’s 
statutory scheme.   
In addition to the pivotal role of education in sustaining our political and 
cultural heritage, denial of education to some isolated group of children 
poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal Protection Clause:  the 
 
236 Id. at 218–19 (“This situation raises the specter of a permanent caste of undocumented 
resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap labor, but never-
theless denied the benefits that our society makes available to citizens and lawful resi-
dents.”). 
237 Id. at 219–20. 
238 Id. at 220 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)). 
239 Id.  Here, the Court cited its reasoning in Weber regarding “the basic concept . . . that le-
gal burdens bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.”  Weber v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). 
240 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220. 
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abolition of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable obstacles to 
advancement on the basis of individual merit.241   
The Court further expressed concern that the law would brand the 
excluded class of children with the “stigma of illiteracy.”242 
The Court purported to apply rational basis review, but departed 
from a traditional application of that standard in a number of ways to 
strike down the statutory scheme.  In his concurrence, Justice Powell 
noted that the Court’s decision was grounded in the same considera-
tions as the cases addressing discrimination against illegitimate chil-
dren:  “Although the analogy is not perfect, our holding today does 
find support in decisions of this Court with respect to the status of il-
legitimates.”243  Justice Powell emphasized that the children were “in-
nocent” with respect to their status.244  On this basis, Justice Powell 
contended that the Court’s review in this case was “properly height-
ened.”245 
Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justices White, Rehnquist, and 
O’Connor in dissent.  The thrust of the dissent pointed to separation 
of powers concerns:  “Were it our business to set the Nation’s social 
policy, I would agree without hesitation that it is senseless for an en-
lightened society to deprive any children—including illegal aliens—
of an elementary education.”246  But it was not the role of the Court, 
Chief Justice Burger argued, to judge the wisdom of social policy.  
“We trespass on the assigned function of the political branches under 
our structure of limited and separated powers when we assume a pol-
icymaking rule as the Court does today.”247  Chief Justice Burger fur-
ther criticized the majority for being unfaithful to precedent, in par-
ticular by “patching together bits and pieces of what might be termed 
quasi-suspect-class and quasi-fundamental-rights analysis, the Court 
spins out a theory custom-tailored to the facts of these cases.”248 
The Court’s most thorough exegesis of suspect classification anal-
ysis appears in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.249  In 
Cleburne, individuals with cognitive disabilities were required by the 
City to go through a special permitting process to establish a group 
home.  These individuals applied and were denied the requested 
 
241 Id. at 221–22. 
242 Id. at 223. 
243 Id. at 238 (Powell, J., concurring). 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 Id. at 242 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
247 Id. 
248 Id. at 244. 
249 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
784 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:3 
 
permit, based in large part on the fears and stereotypes expressed by 
neighbors of the proposed group home. 
The Court began its analysis by considering the argument that in-
dividuals with cognitive disabilities were members of a suspect class.250  
Laying out the backdrop of precedent, the Court emphasized that it 
had declined “to extend heightened review to differential treatment 
based on age,” characterizing “[t]he lesson of Murgia” as follows: 
[W]here individuals in the group affected by a law have distinguishing 
characteristics relevant to the interests the State has the authority to im-
plement, the courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our 
federal system and with our respect for the separation of powers, to close-
ly scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, how, and to what extent 
those interests should be pursued.251 
Thus, drawing on the gender cases as well as Murgia, the Court fo-
cused on the inherent relevance of the trait (whether it “bears . . . [a] 
relation to ability to perform or contribute to society”)252 from the 
perspective of legislatures.  Predictably, the focus on ability stacked 
the deck in the analysis of disability as a suspect classification. 
Indeed, the Court stated at the outset of its analysis that “it is un-
deniable, and it is not argued otherwise here, that those who are 
mentally retarded have a reduced ability to cope with and function in 
the everyday world.”253  The Court further emphasized that the group 
was not homogenous, compromising a “large and diversified 
group”254—something the Court apparently considered unique to this 
group, as compared to women, or racial minorities. 
The Court determined that the fact that there had been a “dis-
tinctive legislative response, both national and state, to the plight of 
those who are mentally retarded”255 demonstrated that the group’s 
concerns were being addressed in the political process,256 and there 
 
250 As a related side note, while the Court’s decision in Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993), is 
sometimes cited for the proposition that mental illness is also not a suspect classification, 
the Court did not, in fact, rule on the issue.  See Julie A. Nice, Whither the Canaries:  On the 
Exclusion of Poor People from Equal Constitutional Protection, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 1023, 1055 
(2012) (“[T]he Supreme Court did not actually hold that persons with developmental 
mental disabilities do not constitute a suspect class, as is sometimes claimed.”). 
251 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441–42. 
252 Id. at 440–41 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)). 
253 Id. at 442. 
254 Id. 
255 Id. at 443. 
256 See id. at 445 (“[T]he legislative response . . . negates any claim that the mentally retarded 
are politically powerless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of 
the lawmakers.”).  The paternalistic premise of this observation becomes apparent when 
one considers whether the “ability to attract the attention of lawmakers” would suffice in 
the case of women or racial minorities. 
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was not official, state-sponsored antipathy toward the group.  The 
Court concluded that “[s]uch legislation thus singling out the retard-
ed for special treatment”—that is, legislation addressing the needs of 
the group—“reflects the real and undeniable differences between the 
retarded and others.”257  The Court expressed concern that careful 
examination of laws benefiting those with cognitive disabilities would 
inhibit lawmakers in their attempts to assist those with cognitive disa-
bilities.258 
Concluding that the group was not a suspect class, the Court went 
on to apply rational basis review to the discrimination at issue.  But, as 
in Plyler, the Court applied a version of rational basis review that ex-
pressed commitment to the same values undergirding suspect classi-
fication analysis—in particular, concern with the larger harms caused 
by reliance on stereotype—and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. 259  
A final important example of a court denying suspect classifica-
tion analysis can be found the Ninth Circuit’s 1990 decision in High 
Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office.260  (As of this 
writing, the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the status of sexual ori-
entation.)  Much like Rodriguez and Murgia, the analysis in High Tech 
Gays is conclusory and dismissive. 
Plaintiffs in that case challenged the Department of Defense’s 
(“DoD”) “policy of subjecting all homosexual applicants for Secret 
and Top Secret clearances to expanded investigations and mandatory 
adjudications, and . . . the alleged DoD policy and practice of refus-
ing to grant security clearances to known or suspected gay appli-
cants.”261 
The DoD regulations provided a detailed and colorful list of crite-
ria for determining eligibility for a clearance:  “[A]ll indications of 
moral turpitude, heterosexual promiscuity, aberrant, deviant or bi-
zarre sexual conduct or behavior, transvestitism [sic], transsexualism, 
indecent exposure, rape, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, 
 
257 Id. at 444.  Accepting this reliance on “real differences” as presumptively permissible con-
flicts with the Court’s reasoning in the gender cases, where the Court held that (1) even 
where generalizations are true, they can still be problematic and (2) the existence of “real 
differences” still merited application of a form of heightened scrutiny—intermediate 
scrutiny, which recognizes that the existence of “real differences” means that classifica-
tions relying on such differences are not per se illegitimate (as is virtually the case for the 
suspect classifications), but still merit careful, case-by-case examination. 
258 See id. (“[M]erely requiring the legislature to justify its efforts in these terms [of height-
ened scrutiny] may lead it to refrain from acting at all.”). 
259 See discussion infra Part II.  
260 High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990). 
261 Id. at 565. 
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child molestation, wife-swapping, window peeping, and similar situa-
tions from whatever source.”262 
In addressing the plaintiffs’ argument that sexual orientation was 
a suspect or quasi-suspect classification meriting heightened equal 
protection scrutiny, the court first noted that, under the Supreme 
Court’s 1986 decision in Bowers, “homosexual activity is not a funda-
mental right protected by substantive due process and that the prop-
er standard of review under the Fifth Amendment is rational basis re-
view.”263  It further reasoned that “because homosexual conduct can 
thus be criminalized, homosexuals cannot constitute a suspect or 
quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis review for 
equal protection purposes.”264 
The Ninth Circuit then engaged in a suspect classification analysis 
using the now-recognized suspect classification criteria: 
To be a “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” class, homosexuals must 1) have 
suffered a history of discrimination; 2) exhibit obvious, immutable, or 
distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group; and 3) 
show that they are either a minority or politically powerless, or alterna-
tively show that the statutory classification at issue burdens a fundamental 
right.265 
Although the court agreed that homosexuals had suffered a histo-
ry of discrimination, the court found the other two factors absent.  
The court stated summarily, “[h]omosexuality is not an immutable 
characteristic; it is behavioral and hence is fundamentally different 
from traits such as race, gender, or alienage, which define already ex-
isting suspect and quasi-suspect classes.”266  “Moreover, legislatures 
have addressed and continue to address the discrimination suffered 
by homosexuals on account of their sexual orientation through the 
passage of anti-discrimination legislation.  Thus, homosexuals are not 
without political power . . . .”267  Accordingly, the court applied ra-
tional basis review to the plaintiffs’ claims. 
In applying rational basis review, the court focused on the plain-
tiffs’ obligation to prove a negative (the absence of a rational basis) 
and the DoD’s lack of obligation to prove anything at all.  The court 
found that “[t]he plaintiffs’ affidavits and evidence fail to make a suf-
ficient showing that the DoD does not have a rational basis for its ex-
 
262 Id. at 566–67. 
263 Id. at 571. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. at 573. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. at 574 (footnote omitted). 
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panded security investigation of homosexuals.”268  “Under a rational 
basis review as promulgated by the Supreme Court in Cleburne, the 
DoD is not required to conclusively establish that homosexuals have 
transmitted classified information for its policy of subjecting homo-
sexual applicants to expanded investigations to be constitutional.”269 
Various studies offered by plaintiffs (pointing out the small num-
ber of homosexuals deemed to actually be a security risk) were 
deemed insufficient to prove the lack of a connection between ho-
mosexual identity and valid security concerns.  Indeed, it is difficult 
to imagine what sort of affirmative evidence would be exhaustive 
enough under deferential rational basis review. 
What the Ninth Circuit essentially did was engage in a cost-benefit 
analysis of using the trait of homosexuality as a proxy for conduct 
that would create a security risk.  In contrast to the gender cases, the 
court did not consider the impact of stereotype and discrimination as 
part of the cost. 
What does the above exposition on the evolution of suspect classi-
fication analysis tell us?  First, that underneath the doctrinal super-
structure of equal protection jurisprudence lies an implicit recogni-
tion that the Court cannot trust itself to root out invidious 
discrimination through the application of a mundane “rational basis” 
standard, as was aptly demonstrated by the failure of reasoning in 
Plessy.  However, since Plessy, the Court has never directly examined 
or addressed the inherent folly of applying deferential rational basis 
review in cases involving facial discrimination against a class of per-
sons.  Instead, it attempted to separate out areas of categorical con-
cern (preliminarily identified in Carolene Products footnote four) while 
leaving all other discriminatory laws subject to what we might proper-
ly term “the Plessy test”—that is, deferential rational basis review. 
We see that the seminal race cases solidified the concept of sus-
pect classes and the associated need for heightened scrutiny, but, 
again, because of the unreflective consensus that race discrimination 
was beyond the pale,270 the Court failed to fully examine and articu-
late the underlying theoretical and jurisprudential justifications for 
creating these categories.  This lack of clarity became manifest in the 
Court’s decisions establishing—in fits and starts—the quasi-suspect 
 
268 Id. at 575. 
269 Id. 
270 This Article certainly does not contest that consensus; rather, it questions the dearth of 
positive reasoning in the precedent explaining why race discrimination is wrong.  With-
out such an accounting, we cannot identify what practices of thought allowed race preju-
dice to be accepted as just, nor identify evolving and contemporary prejudices. 
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classifications, as well as the non-suspect classifications.  By the time 
suspect and quasi-suspect classifications became a closed set in 1977, 
there was still no clear statement of what exactly was required for sus-
pect classification status and why. 
II.  DISCONTENTS 
Unsurprisingly, the doctrinal disarray of suspect classification 
analysis has prompted myriad critiques, as well as attempts to ration-
alize and account for the doctrine.  Responses to suspect classifica-
tion analysis can be placed on a spectrum from those that tend to 
preserve the doctrine to those that seek to modify the doctrine to 
those that seek to abandon it altogether. 
A.  The Pragmatists 
The first category of critiques includes those scholars who do not 
take issue with suspect classification analysis per se, but instead argue 
that the doctrine should be read to include certain groups currently 
not favored with suspect classification analysis.271 
In particular, there is a rich body of scholarship advocating that 
sexual orientation be recognized as a suspect classification, beginning 
as early as 1985, with Carol Steiker’s prescient student note, pub-
lished in the Harvard Law Review.272  In her note, which preceded the 
Court’s decision in Bowers,273 Steiker argued that the interests of gays 
and lesbians could not be adequately protected either by rights to 
privacy or First Amendment rights to free expression.274  Rather, 
recognition as a suspect classification was the key to protecting the 
rights of sexual minorities.  Extending this recognition was justified 
primarily by the extent of discrimination against gays and lesbians, 
 
271 This is, understandably, also the approach of advocates.  See Goldberg, supra note 25, at 
525 (noting that, rather than challenge the fundamental doctrinal structures of equal 
protection analysis, advocates “have sought to satisfy the test for suspect classification ra-
ther than urging a new construct that might create more room for the invalidation of dis-
criminatory classifications”). 
272 Carol Steiker, Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation:  Homosexuality as a Sus-
pect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1297 (1985) (“Whereas arguments for privacy 
and first amendment rights ultimately give way to social consensus, equal protection the-
ory rejects social consensus and the democratic process as the final arbiters of the rightful 
status of social groups.”). 
273 Although Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), did not directly address the issue, its 
holding nonetheless effectively precluded recognition of sexual orientation as a suspect 
classification, at least for the time being. 
274 Steiker, supra note 272, at 1287. 
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Steiker argued.275  Steiker also focused on sexual orientation as an as-
pect of identity, as opposed to mere conduct, and ultimately con-
cluded that “[b]ecause homosexuality is a determinative feature of 
personhood and because gay people have historically been victims of 
stigmatization and discrimination, courts must subject legislation that 
classifies on the basis of sexual orientation to a heightened standard 
of review and must closely scrutinize the state interests embodied in 
the legislation.”276 
Since Steiker’s early piece, numerous other scholars have advocat-
ed for a similar outcome, although with different emphases.277  For 
example, some apply the traditional suspect classification criteria, but 
take issue with interpretation of the evidence regarding immutability, 
specifically the contention that sexual orientation was best under-
stood as a behavior rather than an identity.278  Others contend that 
the Court has already implicitly recognized sexual orientation as a 
suspect classification by applying something more than rational basis 
review in cases involving sexual orientation discrimination.279 
While sexual orientation is perhaps the most examined basis for 
expanding the canon of suspect classifications, scholars have ad-
vanced numerous other groups for recognition, including individuals 
 
275 Id. 
276 Id. at 1305. 
277 See, e.g., John Nicodemo, Homosexuals, Equal Protection, and the Guarantee of Fundamental 
Rights in the New Decade:  An Optimist’s Quasi-Suspect View of Recent Events and Their Impact 
on Heightened Scrutiny for Sexual Orientation-Based Discrimination, 28 TOURO L. REV. 285, 290 
(2012) (“Recent and current federal court rulings, legislative actions (and inactions), so-
cio-political mores, and general statistics and facts regarding the LGBT community will 
reveal that sexual orientation, as a classification for equal protection, clearly warrants 
some level of heightened scrutiny.”); Courtney A. Powers, Finding LGBTs a Suspect Class:  
Assessing the Political Power of LGBTs as a Basis for the Court’s Application of Heightened Scruti-
ny, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 385, 388 (2010) (“Strong support exists for the argu-
ment that statutes distinguishing based on sexual orientation merit heightened review 
because LGBTs meet the criteria courts have consistently employed to determine whether 
a class is suspect.”); Lori J. Rankin, Ballot Initiatives and Gay Rights:  Equal Protection Chal-
lenges to the Right’s Campaign Against Lesbians and Gay Men, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1055, 1073–
78 (1994) (arguing that gay men and lesbians merit suspect classification status under the 
traditional suspect classification criteria). 
278 See Renee Culverhouse & Christine Lewis, Homosexuality as a Suspect Class, 34 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 205, 240 (1993) (citing scientific literature, they argued that “[h]omosexuals do not 
consciously or unconsciously choose homosexuality.  Their sexual orientation is as much 
a part of them as is that of heterosexuals.”). 
279 See Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite:  Why the Supreme Court 
Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Ori-
entation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2770 (2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court not only ought 
to make gay men and lesbians a suspect or quasi-suspect class, but . . . it has in practice al-
ready done so, albeit without the sufficient binding force of precedent.”). 
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who are impoverished, those who are intersex, the elderly, ex-
offenders, the homeless, foreign corporations, and students.280 
Each of these arguments makes an important contribution to our 
awareness of the persistence of social group subordination.  But by 
advancing arguments within the suspect classification framework, 
such analyses necessarily preserve that framework rather than chal-
lenge it.  Advocating for suspect classification recognition validates 
the Court’s hierarchical ordering of social groups, sorting between 
those that are deserving of additional judicial solicitude and those 
that are not. 
B.  The Improvers 
The second category of critiques includes those arguments that 
take issue with certain features of suspect classification analysis, but 
essentially treat it as a coherent doctrinal framework to be worked 
within, if improved.  First and foremost among these critiques is 
Bruce Ackerman’s important essay, Beyond Carolene Products.  In the 
essay, Ackerman situates the “famous words” of Carolene Products foot-
note four in the historical context of the struggle over the Court’s le-
 
280 See, e.g., Hartwin Bungert, Equal Protection for Foreign and Alien Corporations:  Towards Inter-
mediate Scrutiny for a Quasi-Suspect Classification, 59 MO. L. REV. 569, 572 (1994) (examin-
ing foreign corporations under the suspect classification criteria and arguing that classifi-
cations of corporations based on nationality should receive at least intermediate 
scrutiny); Chinyere Ezie, Deconstructing the Body:  Transgender and Intersex Identities and Sex 
Discrimination—The Need for Strict Scrutiny, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 141, 144 (2011) (of-
fering “a new equal protection doctrine that takes cognizance of the realities of sex, and 
regards sex categories as a suspect classification, not based on immutability, but on 
ground of sex categories’ very imprecision”); Nina A. Kohn, Rethinking the Constitutionality 
of Age Discrimination:  A Challenge to a Decades-Old Consensus, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 213, 
233–38 (2010) (arguing that the Court should reconsider whether age is a suspect classi-
fication because the Court’s assessment of the evidence of suspectness in Murgia was 
faulty); Leon Letwin, After Goss v. Lopez: Student Status as Suspect Classification?, 29 STAN. 
L. REV. 627, 630–31 (1977) (“[T]he rights of students should be set aside only when 
compelling state purposes require it, and any such deprivation should be tailored careful-
ly to meet those compelling purposes at minimum cost to constitutional values.”); Nice, 
supra note 250, at 1065–67 (arguing that the Court should revisit heightened scrutiny for 
poverty); Ben Geiger, Comment, The Case for Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1191–93 (2006) (documenting the pervasive marginalization of ex-
offenders in American society and arguing that laws singling out members of this class for 
unique legal burdens ought to be subjected to heightened scrutiny); Jennifer E. Watson, 
Note, When No Place Is Home:  Why the Homeless Deserve Suspect Classification, 88 IOWA L. REV. 
501, 503 (2003) (arguing that, “according to the criteria determined by the Court,” the 
homeless deserve suspect classification). 
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gitimacy during the first half of the twentieth century.281  Ackerman 
credits the Carolene Products case with advancing a coherent political 
theory as well as strategically rehabilitating the Court’s role in our 
democracy.282  If the Court was previously susceptible to accusations 
that it defeated majoritarian democracy when it invalidated legisla-
tion (the so-called “counter-majoritarian difficulty”), it could now de-
fend judicial activism under certain circumstances as justified by a de-
fective political process.  Through this approach, the Court could 
avoid asserting value judgments about the subject matter of legisla-
tion, but instead identify formal features of a defective process. 
Ackerman’s problem with Carolene Products footnote four is based 
on his interpretation of it as standing for the proposition that only 
“discrete and insular minorities” are subject to unfair oppression by 
the majority, and thus the only candidates for judicial protection.283  
Ackerman refutes this proposition, contending instead that discrete 
and insular minorities are much better equipped to participate in 
democratic politics than diffuse minorities.  The focus on discrete 
and insular minorities, Ackerman argues, reflected the blunt mecha-
nisms of political exclusion that existed as of 1938, and fails to ad-
dress evolving and more subtle forms of political marginalization.  
Accordingly, Ackerman called for scholars to rethink the discrete-
and-insular-minority framework in response to the evolution of plu-
ralist politics in the United States. 
Thus, Ackerman redefines those groups with which the Equal Pro-
tection Clause should be concerned (and suggests a “sliding scale of 
Carolene concern,”284 a concept that is pleasingly alliterative but diffi-
cult to imagine the Court articulating and implementing in any prin-
cipled manner).  He does not, however, fundamentally question the 
judiciary’s competence to determine as a matter of fact or law the po-
litical situation of a given social group.  Indeed, Ackerman explicitly 
disclaims any interest in questioning the essential premise of footnote 
four:  that some groups should be entitled to presumptive judicial so-
 
281 Ackerman, supra note 1, at 713 (“These famous words, appearing in the otherwise unim-
portant Carolene Products case, came at a moment of extraordinary vulnerability for the 
Supreme Court.”). 
282 Id. at 714 (“Rather than look back longingly to a repudiated constitutional order, Carolene 
brilliantly endeavored to turn the Old Court’s recent defeat into a judicial victory.”). 
283 Because the footnote is dicta, and because there is nothing in the content or structure of 
the note to suggest that its list of areas of concerns is exhaustive, this is itself a contestable 
proposition. 
284 Ackerman, supra note 1, at 721. 
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licitude while discrimination against other groups is presumptively 
permissible.285 
While Ackerman’s critique focused on the discrete-and-insular-
minority criterion, Janet Halley, writing in 1994, tackled the immuta-
bility factor, specifically in the context of evaluating sexual orienta-
tion as a potential suspect classification.286  Halley noted that scholars 
and advocates had engaged in heated debate over whether the trait 
of sexual orientation was, in fact, immutable.  Halley emphasized, 
however, that the Court did not treat immutability as a firm require-
ment for suspect classification designation in practice.  She further 
argued that by attempting to prove the immutability of sexual orien-
tation—while perhaps advantageous in the short term—advocates 
risked misrepresenting and dividing the gay community.  Again, this 
critique raises important questions about constitutional theory and 
strategy, but stops short of questioning the legitimacy of using factors 
like immutability to draw distinctions between social groups and de-
termine the extent to which they merit special protection from the 
courts. 
Arguing in a similar vein, William Eskridge contended in 2010 
that political powerlessness—supposedly the crux of Carolene Products 
footnote four and the very justification for judicial intervention in 
equal protection cases—was not, in truth, a requirement of suspect 
classification designation.287  Eskridge begins by noting the paradoxi-
cal nature of the political powerlessness criterion, as viewed in the 
particular context of sexual orientation and marriage equality: 
Gay rights advocates have spent a generation seeking political ad-
vances for sexual minorities—yet now find themselves arguing that gay 
men, lesbians, and bisexuals are “politically powerless.”  During the same 
time period, traditionalists have sought to block gay power—yet now say 
that “homosexuals” are political powerhouses.288 
In attempting to explain this conundrum, Eskridge describes the 
manner in which, as a historical proposition, suspect classifications 
based on race, gender and alienage were recognized not when the 
 
285 Ackerman openly states, “My aim here . . . is to work out the doctrinal implications of the 
Carolene formula rather than to criticize its foundations.”  Id. at 722. 
286 Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology:  A Critique of the Argument from 
Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1994). 
287 See Eskridge, supra note 23, at 2.  In the same volume, Richard Levy responds to 
Eskridge’s contentions by pointing to instances in which the Court did examine consid-
erations of political power.  Richard E. Levy, Political Process and Individual Fairness Ration-
ales in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Suspect Classification Jurisprudence, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 33, 38–
45 (2010). 
288 Eskridge, supra note 23, at 1. 
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groups at issue truly lacked any political power, but when they had 
accumulated enough political power to be noticed.  Indeed, Eskridge 
argues, neither immutability nor political powerlessness—the two cri-
teria supposedly most troubling in the case of sexual orientation—
have truly been enforced as suspect classification requirements by the 
Court.  Rather, the Court looks at three quite different criteria:  (1) is 
the class defined by the trait a coherent social group; (2) has the class 
suffered a history of state-sponsored discrimination; and (3) is the 
trait one that generally does not contribute to legitimate public poli-
cies.289 
Eskridge’s argument is both descriptive and normative.  First, he 
contends that the Court has not, as a matter of historical fact, re-
quired that a group actually be politically powerless to attain a suspect 
classification designation.  Second, he asserts that, if the Court were 
to intervene on behalf of groups that are truly politically powerless, it 
would be “too far ahead of political opinion” and thus risk illegitima-
cy and public backlash.290 
Eskridge’s concern with judicial restraint is well-founded, but it 
avoids the twin questions of (1) whether such restraint should per-
haps be modified in the case of equal protection challenges and (2) 
what costs are incurred when the Court cannot recognize and protect 
those groups in our society that are the most marginalized, the most 
despised, and the most disenfranchised. 
C.  The Disassemblers 
Scholars who fall into the final category of critiques are more ac-
tively hostile to suspect classification analysis and its incoherence, and 
propose abandoning the framework altogether. 
These scholars eschew efforts to rationalize or improve upon exist-
ing suspect classification analysis and instead highlight the inconsist-
encies and contradictions plaguing the doctrine.  For example, in a 
2011 article, Marcy Strauss thoroughly documents the extent to which 
“[t]he Supreme Court has not provided a coherent explanation for 
 
289 This begs the question—addressed squarely by Cleburne—of why Courts should consider 
only the categorical issue of whether a trait is “generally” relevant to legislative goals, ver-
sus the specific issue of whether a trait is relevant to the precise legislative goals asserted 
in any given case.  See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 
(1985) (“Because mental retardation is a characteristic that the government may legiti-
mately take into account in a wide range of decisions, . . . we will not presume that any 
given legislative action, even one that disadvantages retarded individuals, is rooted in 
considerations that the Constitution will not tolerate.”). 
290 Eskridge, supra note 23, at 25–26. 
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precisely what factors trigger heightened scrutiny.”291  Strauss con-
tends that the absence of a coherent, disciplined test enables judicial 
manipulation of the doctrine.292  She seeks to “comprehensively and 
systematically expose the flaws, confusion, and unanswered questions 
that inure in the criteria for assessing suspect and nonsuspect clas-
ses.”293  At the conclusion of Strauss’s thought-provoking piece, one is 
left with the conclusion that suspect classification analysis is difficult 
to explain, much less justify. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive and damning critique of suspect 
classification analysis can be found in Suzanne Goldberg’s 2004 arti-
cle, Equality Without Tiers.294  Goldberg’s critique was spurred in part 
by the Court’s affirmative action decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger295 and 
Gratz v. Bollinger,296 in which the Court reiterated its commitment to 
applying strict scrutiny in a symmetrical fashion.  That is, laws explic-
itly implementing race subordination (non-existent for the past sev-
eral decades, although laws with a discriminatory impact persist) and 
those attempting to ameliorate race subordination (affirmative action 
measures) are both subjected to strict scrutiny—which typically leads 
to the challenged law being struck.297  Goldberg questioned whether 
this acontextual application of strict scrutiny was justified, and exam-
ined the foundations of suspect classification analysis to determine 
the answer. 
The resulting tour through suspect classification jurisprudence 
reveals a profoundly inconsistent framework, beset by “intractable in-
ternal contradictions.”298  Most significantly, one of the primary justi-
fications for recognizing and extending special protection to suspect 
classifications is that the excluded class has suffered a history of dis-
crimination.  And yet under this theory, it makes little sense to treat 
as suspect (and apply heightened scrutiny to) laws that discriminate 
against whites in the context of race discrimination, or against men in 
the context of gender discrimination.299  A reasonable explanation for 
symmetry is the notion that certain traits are always irrelevant to law-
 
291 Strauss, supra note 22, at 138. 
292 See id. at 140 (“The ambiguity surrounding equal protection analysis produces incoherent 
results.”). 
293 Id. at 141. 
294 Goldberg, supra note 25. 
295 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
296 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
297 Goldberg, supra note 25, at 482. 
298 Id. at 485. 
299 See id. at 504 (detailing that heightened scrutiny is applied regardless of whether the clas-
sified group has suffered oppression). 
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making, but then what role remains for the history-of-discrimination 
factor of suspect classification analysis?  How can the two justifica-
tions—one historical and the other decidedly ahistorical—be recon-
ciled?  Indeed, implicit in the focus on a history of discrimination is 
the notion that suspect classification designation is a type of remedial 
measure.  How then, can this judicial remedy be used to prohibit leg-
islatively enacted remedial measures (that is, affirmative action)? 
Goldberg’s solution is to develop a single standard of review for all 
equal protection claims.  Goldberg’s proposed standard focuses on 
enhancing the consideration of context and eliminating reliance on 
generalizations.  She does not, however, explicitly engage the issue of 
which party should bear the burden of proof under her test.  Nor 
does Goldberg discuss what would count as evidence under her test, 
or suggest that the standard would “ban . . . judicial hypothesizing.”300  
As discussed below, these issues—the burden of proof and the role of 
judicial speculation—are at the heart of modern equal protection ju-
risprudence’s failings and must be addressed by any effort at doctri-
nal reform. 
Further, in a curious move, Goldberg characterizes the tiers of 
scrutiny as a “‘training’ tool for the Supreme Court and lower courts 
that lacked an inclination or ability to identify bias or outmoded ste-
reotypes within familiar classifications.”301  This seems to assume that 
courts have evolved in this respect—an assumption that does not ap-
pear to be grounded in reality.  If we take Reva Siegel’s thesis of 
“preservation through transformation” seriously, then courts need to 
be ever more vigilant and forward-looking to really do the job of pro-
tecting against impermissible prejudice becoming enshrined in the 
law. 
III.  TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE BEYOND SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS 
As demonstrated above, suspect classification analysis is under at-
tack.  Critics allege that the analysis does not protect groups that 
should be protected, that it places the emphasis on the wrong con-
siderations, and that it is inconsistently applied and beset by “intrac-
table internal contradictions”302 on a doctrinal level. 
But while there is much to criticize about suspect classification 
analysis in terms of its outcomes and doctrinal incoherence, these are 
not, in fact, the fundamental flaws of the doctrine.  Rather, the fun-
 
300 Id. at 555. 
301 Id. at 493. 
302 Id. at 485. 
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damental flaw of the doctrine is that it asks the wrong question, 
namely:  what social groups are deserving of special judicial solicitude 
(by virtue of their political marginalization, or the fact that they have 
no control over the trait that defines them, or the history of discrimi-
nation they have experienced)? 
What equal protection analysis should be concerned with is how 
the judiciary can competently (that is, based on competent evidence 
and without invoking subjective policy judgments) identify laws that 
violate the “normative philosophy” of the Equal Protection Clause.  
This necessitates assessing the attributes of the laws, not the groups 
against which they discriminate—and also identifying what we mean 
by the “normative philosophy” of the Equal Protection Clause. 
Fortunately, although the Court’s suspect classification jurispru-
dence does not present a coherent or particularly workable doctrinal 
framework, it does set forth principles that can help us discern the 
contours of the elusive “normative philosophy” of equal protection. 
The following Subpart first describes in greater detail the funda-
mental flaw of suspect classification analysis, in particular the way in 
which the doctrine affirmatively preserves and justifies evolving forms 
of discrimination.  It then performs an alternative reading of the 
precedent to identify themes in reasoning that transcend the context 
of any one case and point to larger values animating the Court’s 
equal protection jurisprudence. 
A.  The Fundamental Illegitimacy of Suspect Classification Analysis 
It is by now beyond argument that suspect classification analysis is 
rife with inconsistencies and contradictions.  Further, despite the best 
efforts of scholars to provide the Court with an overarching theoreti-
cal justification for the doctrine, the Court’s own inconsistent appli-
cation and explanation of the doctrine, paired with its general reluc-
tance to justify it at all, ultimately defeat these efforts.  The doctrine’s 
origins are both remote and opaque; its subsequent development was 
chaotic and under-theorized. 
But the doctrine is more than incoherent.  In keeping with Reva 
Siegel’s theory of preservation through transformation,303 suspect 
classification analysis goes beyond failing to promote equality to ac-
tively sustaining structures of inequality. 
First and most importantly, the fundamental premise of suspect 
classification is that it is presumptively permissible to facially discriminate 
 
303 Siegel, supra note 3, at 1119. 
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against social groups unless the Supreme Court declares otherwise.  There is 
nothing in the history or text of the Equal Protection Clause to sug-
gest that limiting equal protection concern in this manner is warrant-
ed. 
It is true of course that the Equal Protection Clause was originally 
intended to prevent state-sponsored discrimination against one social 
group in particular:  emancipated slaves.304  But the Court has long 
held that the provision should be interpreted as serving the larger 
purpose of preventing all forms of state-sponsored invidious discrim-
ination.305  Once this step is taken, it is not at all apparent that the 
Court should be essentially ranking social groups with respect to one 
another to achieve this mission.  Stated another way, is it the nature 
of the group being discriminated against that makes the discrimina-
tion invidious, or the nature of the discrimination itself? 
By comparing social groups to one another and sorting them into 
suspect, quasi-suspect, and non-suspect classes, the Court itself en-
gages in discriminatory, hierarchical ordering of these social groups 
with respect to one another.  Worse yet, this ordering is virtually 
permanent.  Rather than analyzing the relevance of a particular trait 
in the context of a specific discriminatory action, the Court declares 
certain classifications suspect for all time and in all circumstances.  
And although this designation is based on history, it then becomes 
permanent and ahistorical, applied with symmetry306 to subordinated 
and non-subordinated groups, and unlikely to be subject to reexami-
nation.  On the other side of the equation, once a group has been 
declared non-suspect, the binding force of precedent discourages re-
consideration.  The fact that suspect classification status is a perma-
nent rather than contextual designation increases its impact, and in 
this sense, its value, making it more likely to be seen and treated as a 
scarce doctrinal resource. 
Treating suspect classification status and heightened scrutiny as 
scarce resources in turn preserves excessively deferential rational ba-
sis review as the default standard.  The distinction drawn between 
heightened scrutiny and rational basis review constantly and unreflec-
tively reinforces the notion that the vast majority of facial discrimina-
tion against social groups is presumptively permissible. 
In addition to enforcing this presumption, suspect classification 
analysis calls upon the Court to evaluate realities outside of judicial 
 
304 Strauss, supra note 22, at 142. 
305 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968). 
306 See supra notes 295–96 and accompanying text. 
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competence.  Even if the Court were to rely on expert testimony to 
assess political powerlessness (as opposed to its normal practice of 
simply eye-balling the issue, presumably based on the Justices’ subjec-
tive perceptions), this is not the sort of thing that courts should be 
ruling on, much less enshrining into permanent doctrine.  Political 
realities are constantly shifting over time.  Further, other questions 
related to suspect classification analysis—for example, the question of 
“immutability” vis-à-vis sexuality, gender, and race307—are hotly con-
tested and ever-evolving. 
Finally, suspect classification analysis asks the wrong question, and 
scrutinizes the wrong actor.  Suspect classification analysis essentially 
boils down to asking whether the social group at issue is deserving of 
special judicial solicitude.308  The more the group has been unfairly 
marginalized, the more likely that discrimination against its members 
will be subjected to heightened scrutiny.  This approach relies on a 
questionable assumption that the Court can properly identify social 
and political marginalization, and in particular, in the case of con-
temporary prejudices.  In fact, suspect classification factors like im-
mutability and relevance of the defining trait internalize rather than 
externalize subjective judgments of the worthiness of a group. 
Further, as discussed below, suspect classification analysis focuses 
exclusively on the political process that produces a law and broad (as 
well as inconsistent) assumptions about the ability of certain groups 
to affect that process given our majoritarian system.309  But such an 
approach utterly ignores the constitutive function of the law—the way 
in which, for example, homosexuals would not necessarily be consid-
ered a distinct social group, much less an unfairly persecuted one, 
until anti-sodomy laws defined sexual orientation as a fixed identity 
and attached burdens to sexual practice.310  Read carefully with an eye 
toward identifying broader principles, the Court’s suspect classifica-
tion analysis suggests that it is this constitutive function with which we 
should be most concerned, and that should drive the mechanics of 
equal protection analysis. 
 
307 Indeed, one could argue that race identity was patently indeterminate at the time of 
Plessy, where Plessy himself was legally designated as “Negro” although this was not dis-
cernable in his appearance. 
308 See generally Halley, supra note 286 (reviewing the debate as to whether sexual orientation 
is immutable). 
309 See infra notes 312–15 and accompanying text. 
310 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling:  Identity-Based Social Movements, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
419, 422 (2001) (“Much of what made it intelligible (as well as denigrating) to be a ‘col-
ored person’ or a ‘homosexual’ or a ‘retarded person’ was the line drawn by law and the 
discourse stimulated by legal actors.”). 
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B.  An Alternative Reading of Suspect Classification Jurisprudence 
In 1985, Bruce Ackerman read Carolene Products footnote four as 
articulating a political theory and a theory of judicial review designed 
to rehabilitate the Court’s legitimacy at a time when it was under at-
tack.311  The political theory contends that laws targeting certain mi-
nority groups are the product of a flawed majoritarian democratic 
process—namely, the political and social marginalization of those 
groups such that its members cannot adequately represent them-
selves in that process.312  The fact of this flaw, in turn, justifies the 
counter-majoritarian institution of judicial review.313  The role of the 
judiciary is to identify which groups have been unfairly marginalized 
such that laws discriminating against them may be carefully scruti-
nized.314  And the judiciary employs the doctrine of suspect classifica-
tion analysis to that end. 
It is possible to read the Court’s subsequent suspect classification 
jurisprudence in a similar manner, but to different conclusions. Caro-
lene Products footnote four clearly expressed a concern with “discrete 
and insular minorities” and the challenges such groups would face in 
our majoritarian political system.315  By contrast, the Court’s subse-
quent suspect classification jurisprudence—particularly the Court’s 
treatment of gender, non-marital status, and some of the so-called 
non-suspect classifications—expresses a concern not with the relative 
political power of social groups, but with the quality of individual self-
determination.  For example, where laws relied on gender stereo-
types, this interfered with the ability of both men316 and women317 to 
chart their own destiny based on their individual ability.  Similarly, 
the problem with attaching legal penalties to a child’s non-marital 
status was that the child had no control over that status.318  Such laws 
are problematic because they decouple legal burdens from individual 
responsibility. 
Further, these cases express concern not only with political mar-
ginalization preceding adoption of discriminatory laws, but political 
 
311 See supra note 281 and accompanying text. 
312 Ackerman, supra note 1, at 715. 
313 Id. 
314 See supra Part I.C. 
315 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938). 
316 E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a law banning 
the sale of 3.2% alcohol beer to males, but not females, age eighteen to twenty). 
317 E.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (striking down a law preferring males over fe-
males as administrators of estates). 
318 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968). 
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marginalization resulting from adoption of discriminatory laws.  This 
idea—that certain discriminatory laws have the result of calcifying 
class distinctions—is most strongly expressed in the cases dealing with 
the rights of children.  For example, in Plyler, the Court focused on 
the fact that imposing a disability (exclusion from public education) 
on the children of undocumented immigrants “permanently locked 
[these children] into the lowest socio-economic class,”319 thus prevent-
ing future social and economic mobility based on individual merit. 
Thus, the political theory underlying much of the Court’s post-
Carolene Products jurisprudence actually focuses more on the individu-
al than on the group.  Specifically, it seeks to preserve (1) an ethos of 
self-determination based on individual merit and, in connection with 
this, (2) a modicum of social mobility in which individuals can ex-
press that merit. 
While Carolene Products’ focus on groups and the dynamics of 
group marginalization suggested one justification for judicial review 
(as a corrective for majoritarian excesses), the above-described focus 
on individual self-determination suggests another.  If the majoritarian 
process is generally to be trusted except where it imposes legal bur-
dens on politically powerless minorities, then the role of judicial re-
view is to intervene only where the targeted group is politically power-
less (that is, a suspect classification).  But if, instead, we recognize 
that laws always have the ability to interfere with self-determination 
(simply by relying on facial classifications of persons), then the role 
of judicial review is to intervene whenever a law imposes legal bur-
dens in a way that does not correspond to individual responsibility.  
As the cases suggest, this occurs where laws rely on status as a proxy 
for conduct.320  Such reliance is offensive to democracy even if there is 
a measure of accuracy to the stereotype.321 
If suspect classification analysis was the proper doctrinal mecha-
nism for enforcing the political theory of Carolene Products footnote 
four, what alternative doctrinal mechanism can enforce the princi-
 
319 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S 202, 208 (1982) (quoting Doe v. Plyler, 485 F. Supp. 569, 577 (E.D. 
Tex. 1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
320 See, e.g., Craig, 429 U.S. at 201–02 (holding a law unconstitutional that used gender status 
as a proxy for drunk driving conduct). 
321 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (“When persons are ex-
cluded from participation in our democratic processes [here, jury service] solely because 
of race or gender, this promise of equality dims, and the integrity of our judicial system is 
jeopardized.”).  Justice O’Connor’s concurrence acknowledged that “gender-based as-
sumptions about juror attitudes” were “sometimes accurate,” but nevertheless agreed that 
state actors could not make use of them.  Id. at 150 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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ples of self-determination and social mobility established in the 
Court’s broader jurisprudence? 
The answer, unsurprisingly, comes from one of the Court’s deci-
sions dealing with a non-suspect class:  City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Liv-
ing Center, Inc.322  In that case, the Court determined that individuals 
with cognitive disabilities were not properly considered a suspect class 
primarily because the trait of cognitive disability, as a general matter, 
was relevant to one’s ability to function in society and therefore a trait 
that could validly be considered by governmental actors.323  But the 
Court struck the regulation at issue nonetheless, as a result of apply-
ing what some have deemed “heightened rational basis review.”  The 
Court’s analysis in Cleburne is more accurately described as a sort of 
“micro-suspect classification analysis”324 or “trait-relevancy analysis.” 
The essential features of this analysis are as follows.  Where a law 
or other government action relies on a facial classification of persons, 
the burden is on the government to prove an affirmative connection 
between the trait that defines the targeted group and the governmen-
tal and individual interests being regulated.  Thus, in Cleburne, the 
trait of cognitive disability was unrelated to either the government’s 
interest in regulating group housing or the individual’s interest in ac-
cessing group housing.325  Similarly, in Plyler, the trait of undocu-
mented immigration status was unrelated to either the government’s 
interest in regulating public education or the child’s interest in ac-
cessing public education. 
This analysis can account for not only the cases involving groups 
not recognized as suspect classes, but also the traditional suspect clas-
sification cases.  For example, in Brown, there was no relationship be-
tween race and the interests involved in public education.  In Fron-
tiero, there was no relationship between gender and the entitlement 
to certain military benefits.  In Weber, there was no relationship be-
tween a child’s non-marital status and the entitlement to wrongful 
death benefits. 
What are the advantages of this approach as opposed to tradition-
al suspect classification analysis?  As alluded to above, one of the pri-
mary benefits is that such an analysis relies on evidence that judges 
can competently assess.  While trait-relevancy analysis is not entirely 
immune to the effect of contemporary prejudices, concrete evidence 
about the relevance of a specific trait to a specific regulated interest 
 
322 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
323 Id. at 442. 
324 Pollvogt, supra note 24, at 927. 
325 Id. 
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provides a firmer footing for analysis than broad judgments about the 
relative political power of social groups. 
Another advantage is that the analysis is infinitely more flexible 
than suspect classification analysis.  Once the Court determines that a 
classification is “suspect,” it is suspect for all time and under all cir-
cumstances.  This categorical approach in essence “freezes” our un-
derstanding of discrimination and prejudice, reducing sensitivity to 
societal evolution in these arenas.  By contrast, trait-relevancy analysis 
is fact- and context-specific, allowing more nuanced and nimble de-
terminations over time. 
Finally, because this standard forces the government to justify all 
facial discrimination and relies on relatively concrete and objective 
criteria as opposed to broad judgments about social reality, it is more 
adept at identifying evolving and contemporary prejudices.  Current-
ly, discrimination against classes that have not been deemed suspect 
or quasi-suspect is subject to deferential rational basis review, which 
does not require the government to justify a discriminatory measure 
in any way, shape, or form.326  Creating a presumption that the gov-
ernment must justify all facially discriminatory laws forces the gov-
ernment to provide reasons and rationales in every case, which can 
help to out irrational, stereotyped thinking. 
CONCLUSION 
[T]hat a characteristic may be relevant under some or even many 
circumstances does not suggest any reason to presume it relevant under 
other circumstances where there is reason to suspect it is not.  A sign that 
says “men only” looks very different on a bathroom door than a courthouse 
door.327 
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s comment is significant on at least two 
levels.  First, it is a prime example of the evolution of standards of 
fairness and equal treatment.  In 1985, it was plausible for Justice 
Marshall to claim that labeling bathroom doors with gender assign-
ments was uncontroversial; in 2013, this is an issue of serious debate. 
Second, Justice Marshall expressed a truth that transcends the 
specific facts of his example.  The dynamics of impermissible discrim-
ination are fluid and context-specific.  They are not amenable to 
fixed categorization.  They require exploration through concrete, re-
al evidence (rather than untethered judicial speculation) such that 
the reasons for any particular act of discrimination can be offered, ex-
 
326 See supra Intro.B. 
327 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 468–69 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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amined, and assessed.  Moving toward an equal protection framework 
that can undertake this analytical task requires moving beyond sus-
pect classifications. 
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